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109028, Москва,
Покровский бульвар, дом 11, каб. Т-614
(проезд: м. Тургеневская/Чистые пруды, Китай-город, Курская/Чкаловская)
тел: (495) 628-83-68
почта: fes@hse.ru
Экономическая политика. 2024. Т. 98. № 2. С. 6-35.
В печати
In bk.: Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Economics and Finance. Oxford University Press, 2024.
Dagaev D., Paklina S., Parshakov P.
Social Science Research Network. Social Science Research Network. SSRN, 2024
Международный рекрутинг
Программа международного рекрутинга НИУ ВШЭ предусматривает найм на должность профессорско-преподавательского состава специалистов с международного рынка труда, имеющих международно признанную степень PhD, опыт преподавательской работы и значительный исследовательский потенциал.
Факультет экономических наук приветствует новых доцентов по экономике, нанятых по процедуре международного рекрутмента в 2016 году!
Челик Катрениак Дагмара, степень PhD в Центре экономических исследований и высшего образования Карлова университета и экономики и Института академии наук (CERGE-EI), Чехия.
Исследовательские интересы лежат в области экономики развития, экспериментальная экономики, экономики образования, прикладной микроэкономики и поведенческая экономики. Приступает к работе в ВШЭ в сентябре 2016 г.
Исследовательские интересы лежат в области макрофинансов, налоговой политики, финансовой эконометрике и банковского дела. Приступает к работе в сентябре 2016 г.
Исследовательские интересы лежат в области математики и статистики (дробно дифференциальные уравнения, теория игр, математическая биология, медицинская математика, анализ данных и др.).
Приступает к работе в ВШЭ в сентябре 2016 г.
Исследовательские интересы лежат в области прикладной игры и теории сетей, промышленной организации и международной экономики. Приступает к работе в ВШЭ с марта 2017 г.
Семинары 2015-2016 учебного года
Список сотрудников факультета, нанятых на международном рынке:
PhD по экономике, Брауновский Университет, 2012
Департамент теоретической экономики: Доцент
Адрес: Шаболовка 26, корп. 3, оф. 3116А
Тел. +7 (495) 772-95-90, доб. 26174
Email: darbatli@hse.ru; earbatli@gmail.com
Исследовательские интересы: политэкономия, экономический рост и долгосрочность сравнительного экономического развития.
PhD по финансам, Лондонская школа экономики и политических наук, 2014
Департамент финансов: Доцент
Адрес: Шаболовка 26, корп.4, оф. 4317
Тел. +7 (495) 772-95-90, доб. 26247
Email: vdobrynskaya@hse.ru
Исследовательские интересы: эмпирическое ценообразование активов, макро-финансы, международные финансы, поведенческая экономика и финансы
PhD по экономике, Университет Гронингена, 1990
Департамент теоретической экономики: Профессор
Адрес: Шаболовка 26, корп.3, оф.3213
Тел. +7 (495) 772-95-90, доб. 26229
Email: maarten.janssen@univie.ac.at
Исследовательские интересы: аукционы, неблагоприятный отбор и передача сигналов, координационные игры и координационные центры, промышленная организация и политика в области конкуренции
PhD по экономике, Мичиганский Университет, 2001
Департамент теоретической экономики: Профессор
Адрес: Шаболовка 26, корп.3, оф.3305
Тел. +7 (495) 772-95-90, доб. 26021 или 26311
Email: ozamulin@hse.ru
Исследовательские интересы: макроэкономика
Кандидат экономических наук: Центральный экономико-математический институт РАН
Департамент теоретической экономики: Доцент
Адрес: Шаболовка 26, корп.3, оф.3116В
Тел. +7 (495) 772 95 90, доб. 26176
Email: al.v.zakharov@gmail.com
Исследовательские интересы: Формальная политическая теория, особенно с применением к электоральному поведению, фальсификации выборов, Эмпирические исследования в поведении голосования
PhD по экономике, Стокгольмская школа экономики, 2009
Департамент прикладной экономики: Доцент
Адрес: Шаболовка 26, корп. 3, оф. 3228Б
Тел. +7 (495) 772 95 90, доб. 26173
Email: olazareva@hse.ru
Исследовательские интересы: Экономика труда, экономика персонала, экономика образования, экономика фирмы, корпоративного управления, корпоративных финансов
PhD по экономке, Университет штата Северная Каролина, 2008
Департамент теоретической экономики: Доцент
Адрес: Шаболовка 26, корп.3, оф. 3432
Тел. +7 (495) 772 95 90, доб. 26106
Email: kmarinakis@hse.ru; kmarinakis@hotmail.com
Исследовательские интересы: микроэкономика, теория контрактов, теория стимулов, экспериментальная экономика, математические и количественные методы.
PhD по экономике, Свободный университет Брюсселя, 2012
Департамент прикладной экономики: Доцент
Адрес: Шаболовка 26, корп.3, оф. 3224А
Тел. + 7 (495) 772 95 90, доб. 26178
Email: kpanidi@hse.ru
Исследовательские интересы: Поведенческая/экспериментальная экономика и ее приложения к экономике здравоохранения, экономики образования и других областях
PhD по математике, Университет Гумбольдта, 2012
Департамент статистики и анализа данных: Доцент
Адрес: Шаболовка31-Г, оф.717
Тел. +7 (495) 772-95-90 *26215
Email: vpanov@hse.ru
Исследовательские интересы: Процессы Леви, статистические методы для случайных процессов, стохастическое моделирование, интеллектуальный анализ данных, прикладная вероятность
PhD по статистике, Высшая нормальная школа Кашана, 2013
Департамент статистики и анализа данных: Доцент
Адрес: Шаболовка 31-Г, оф.715
Тел. +7 (495) 772-95-90 *26291
Email: qparis@hse.ru
Исследовательские интересы: статистическая теория обучения и ее приложения
PhD по экономике, Университет европейского института во Флоренции, 2012
Департамент прикладной экономики: Доцент
Адрес: Шаболовка 26, корп.3, оф. 3116Б
Тел. +7 (495) 772 9590 *26175
Email: asirchenko@hse.ru
Исследовательские интересы: Эконометрика (методология и приложения)
PhD по экономике, Свободный унивреситет Брюсселя, 2005
Департамент финансов: Доцент
Адрес: Шаболовка 26, корп.4, оф. 4318
Тел. +7 (495) 772-95-90, *26011
Email: sstepanov@hse.ru; sergeystepan@gmail.com
Исследовательские интересы: Корпоративные финансы, экономика информации, теория контрактов, микроэкономика
PhD по экономике, Университет Тулуза-1, 2006
Департамент теоретической экономики: Доцент
Адрес: Шаболовка 26, корп.3, оф.3225
Тел. +7 (495) 772-95-90, *26177
Email: asuvorov@hse.ru
Исследовательские интересы: поведенческая экономика, теория контрактов, промышленная организация
Кандидат наук: Московский государственный университет им. М.В. Ломоносова, 1998
Департамент прикладной экономики: Профессор
Адрес: Шаболовка 26, корп.5, оф. 5315
Тел. +7 (495) 772-95-90, *26304
Email: ksonin@hse.ru
Исследовательские интересы: политическая экономия; институциональная экономика; экономическая теория.
PhD по экономике, Университет штата Пенсильвания, 2009
Департамент теоретической экономики: Доцент
Адрес: Шаболовка 26, корп.4, оф. 4230
Тел. +7 (495) 772 95 90 *26288
Email: atarasov@hse.ru
Исследовательские интересы: теоретическая, эмпирическая и количественная международная экономика, промышленная организация, экономическая теория, экономика образования и экономическая география.
PhD по экономике, Унивреситет Аликанте, 2011
Департамент теоретической экономики: Доцент
Адрес: Шаболовка 26, корп.3, оф. 3228А
Тел. +7 (495) 772-95-90 *26289
Email: rchuhay@gmail.com, rchuhay@hse.ru
Исследовательские интересы: Микроэкономика, социальные сети, промышленные организации, экономика, финансовая экономика
PhD по экономике, Виргинский университет, 2007
Департамент теоретической экономики: Доцент
Адрес: Шаболовка 26, корп.3, оф.3224Б
Тел. +7 (495) 772-95-90 *26264
Email: lcelik@hse.ru
Исследовательские интересы: промышленная организация (с акцентом на раскрытие информации, рекламы, дифференциации продукции и поиска потребителя), международная торговля и политическая экономия
В течение всего года Факультет экономических наук проводит международные семинары с участием приглашенных международных ученых и уже имеющих контракт с НИУ ВШЭ международных сотрудников.
Семинары 2015-2016 учебного года
Семинары проходят по адресу Шаболовка 26, корп.3, ауд. 3211
«Is Mining Fuelling Long-Run Growth in Russia? Industry Productivity Growth trends Since 1995»
Abstract: GDP per capita growth rates in Russia have been amongst the highest in the world since the mid-1990s. Previous growth accounting research at the macro-level suggests that this was mainly driven by multi-factor productivity (MFP) growth. In this paper we analyze for the first time the drivers of Russian growth at the level of industries. We derive a proper measure of capital services, instead of using stock measures as in previous research. Using this, we find that aggregate GDP growth is driven as much by capital input as MFP growth. Mining and Retailing industries are growing fast, but have poor MFP performance. In contrast, MFP growth was high in goods-producing industries but their share in GDP declined. MFP growth was highest in those industries that were particularly underdeveloped in the Russian economy in the 1990s.
Наиль Кашаев (The Pennsylvania State University)
«Testing for Nash behavior in entry games with complete information»
Abstract: Nash equilibrium (NE) is a leading solution concept in the empirical analysis of entry games. The NE assumption is crucial, not just for estimation, but also for the validity of counterfactual exercises and policy implications. I propose a computationally simple sieve likelihood ratio type procedure to test the NE assumption in a complete information entry game with second-order rational players. The method is robust to partial identification and allows for nonparametric selection of equilibria.
Эмре Доган (HSE)
«An egalitarian solution to minimum cost spanning tree problems»
Abstract:We introduce a new and easy to compute core selection to minimum cost spanning tree problems that is strongly stable (satisfying absence-proofness (AP)), continuous, cost and population monotonic (PM), meeting solidarity (SOL) and ranking. We prove that it Lorenz dominates every other allocation in the irreducible core of the problem. As a corollary, it Lorenz dominates the celebrated folk solution whenever these solutions yield different outcomes. We also provide two characterizations of our solution. Finally, we discuss that it may yield allocations that are Lorenz inferior to some other allocations in the standard stand alone core of the problem. However, any selection from the Lorenz maximal allocations in the standard core comes at the cost of AP, PM, SOL, and possibly computational complexity.
Мария Тетерятникова (University of Vienna)
«R&D in the Network of Trade: The Role of Asymmetry»
Abstract: This paper argues that asymmetry in countries' trade exposure and the degree of asymmetry are important determinants of R&D and productivity of a rm and welfare of a country. In asymmetric hub-and-spoke trade network hub economy, that trades with a large number of other countries, has higher R&D, productivity and welfare than a spoke country, that trades with a few. Moreover, the larger the degree of network asymmetry, the larger the di erence. By contrast, in the symmetric trade network R&D of a country is lower than in a hub but higher than in a spoke. This implies that regional/preferential type of trade, which results in highly asymmetric trade network, bene ts hub economies but harms spokes. Contrarily, multilateral trade, which gives rise to a symmetric complete network, improves R&D and welfare of all countries.
Мадина Карамышева (Bocconi University)
"Can Uncertainty Explain the Heterogeneous Output Effects of Fiscal Adjustments?"
Abstract: Recent empirical evidence suggests that fiscal consolidations mainly based on tax hikes have a more recessionary impact on economic growth relative to those based on expenditure cuts. In this paper I evaluate the output effects of fiscal adjustment plans identified through the narrative approach. Plans are different from shocks that are usually considered in the literature, since fiscal plans track more closely the dynamics of fiscal policy. I incorporate fiscal plans into a vector autoregression model to investigate the channels of transmission of fiscal consolidations. In addition to a direct effect of fiscal adjustment plans on output I explore two indirect effects. In particular, I investigate whether monetary policy or uncertainty could explain the heterogeneous output effects of fiscal adjustment plans. The evidence indicates that uncertainty increases following tax-based fiscal plans and decreases following expenditure-based fiscal plans. Monetary policy cannot fully explain this difference. By closing the monetary policy and uncertainty channels, first, one at a time and then both together, I measure how much of difference in output effects of fiscal adjustment plans is due to each particular channel. Finally, I investigate whether my empirical results are consistent with the simulation of a general equilibrium model.
Александр Нестеров (Humboldt University Berlin)
"School choice with advice: the adaptive acceptance rule"
Abstract:We propose a new way to assign students to primary schools: the Adaptive Acceptance rule (AA). AA collects vNM preferences of students over schools and implements the assignment using an iterative procedure similar to the prevalent Immediate Acceptance algorithm (IA). Unlike IA, AA dynamically chooses the best application strategy on behalf of students. AA enjoys a strong combination of incentive and efficiency properties compared to IA and its rival, the Deferred Acceptance rule (DA). In case of strict priorities (as in Ergin and Sönmez, 2006) AA implements the student-optimal stable matching in dominant strategies, which dominates each equilibrium outcome of IA. In case of no priorities, AA is ex-post efficient while some equilibrium outcomes of IA are not; also, AA causes loss of ex-ante efficiency less often than DA. If, in addition, students have common ordinal preferences (as in Abdulkadiroglu, Che and Yasuda, 2011), AA is non-manipulable in large economies and ex-ante dominates DA. Simulations of a general case (as in Erdil and Ergin, 2008) show that the simplified version of AA restores up to approximately one half of the welfare loss associated with DA. AA can also be implemented as an add-on for either DA or IA in case only some students report their vNM preferences while others report only ordinal preferences.
Сергей Колбин (Columbia University)
"Precision of Communication in Coordination Games of Regime Change"
Abstract: I study a model of regime change in which the government can communicate with di erent levels of precision as a function of the underlying fundamentals. In the model, higher precision of communication corresponds to a lower dispersion of private information among market participants. I compare a policy of an uncommitted government, which chooses the precision of communication after it learns the realization of fundamentals, to a policy of a committed government, which commits to a state-dependent policy before it learns the realization of fundamentals. I nd that an uncommitted government communicates imprecisely for weak fundamentals and precisely for strong fundamentals. In contrast, a committed government communicates precisely for weak fundamentals and imprecisely for strong fundamentals. Consequently, a committed government saves its regime more often than an uncommitted one. An uncommitted government can bene t from a rule that enforces constant precision of communication.
Маргарита Забелина (Emory University)
"Market power and the frequency of price adjustments: new facts from Mexico"
Abstract. This paper studies the relationship between the price-setting behavior of rms and their market power. Using Mexican CPI data between 1994 and 2002, I document two novel facts: First, there is a non-monotone relationship between the degree of market power and the frequency of price adjustments. For tradable goods, this relationship is positive; for non-tradable goods, which are often associated with stronger customer relations, the relationship is negative. Second, a large shock to the rms marginal cost increases the frequency of price adjustments. Particularly for goods with a very stable price history. To reconcile the empirical ndings with the theory, I develop a menu cost model in which the price-setting behavior of rms a ects their market share. In contrast to a standard theory, this model predicts a non-monotone relationship between the frequency of price adjustments and rms' market power, approximated by customers switching costs.
Олег Рубанов (London Business School)
"Asymptotic Full Revelation in Cheap Talk with a Large Number of Senders"
Abstract.Strategic information transmission, commonly referred to as “cheap talk”, was first introduced by Crawford and Sobel (1982), who showed that there is only a limited amount of information that can be transmitted from an informed sender to an uninformed receiver. This paper shows that it is possible to achieve high precision of information transmission with multiple senders by constructing an equilibrium which converges to full revelation exponentially fast with the number of senders. This equilibrium is robust to small perturbations, unlike previous attempts to achieve full revelation with multiple senders in this setting. The equilibrium can also be constructed for multidimensional state-spaces and achieves arbitrarily high precision even if each sender is only allowed to send two types of messages.
Марк Ражев (Princeton University)
"Input-Output Structure and Trade Elasticity Preliminary"
Abstract.This paper studies how disaggregated input-output interactions shape trade and welfare responses to changes in trade costs. I consider a model with a large number of products linked through a general "snakes and spiders" network. The central feature of the model which also makes it highly intractable is endogenous formation of comparative advantage. To overcome this complexity challenge, I obtain a perturbation solution in terms of intuitive summary statistics. I find that, in contrast to the composite intermediate good structure often employed in the literature, imperfect supplier diversification transforms fundamental comparative advantage in two ways. First, as exogenous productivity differences accumulate along supply chains, endogenous variation in relative costs is increasing in the level of trade frictions. Second, comparative advantage of upstream and downstream industries becomes positively correlated. The first effect generates larger welfare gains from trade and also raises the average product-level import share. The second effect, however, is trade-reducing: the tendency of comparative-advantage industries to source dispro-portionately from each other increases the aggregate home bias. Such comparative advantage spillovers are relatively strong for moderate trade costs, dominating the average import share effect, but decay fast closer to autarky. As a result, the elasticity of trade is generally non-monotone in the level of trade costs.
Алексей Смолин (Yale University)
«Optimal Feedback Design»
Abstract. I study a problem of optimal feedback provision. An agent of uncertain ability repeatedly supplies effort and a principal provides feedback on his performance. Feedback is valuable but may discourage the agent and dampen his effort. I show that a policy, optimal for the principal among all persuasion mechanisms, is coarse yet tractable. In each period, the principal only informs the agent whether her current belief on his ability is above a chosen cutoff. The agent is expected to exert effort above the cutoff and is threatened with no feedback for deviating. Depending on performance technology, optimal feedback can be provided through a tenure-track or performance standard policy. With access to monetary incentives, even under moral hazard, the principal can extract full surplus by providing coarse feedback and backloading compensation into the future. These results alert to adverse effects of increasing performance transparency in organizations and may explain many features of professional contracts.
Мария Веретенникова (University of Warwick)
«Controlled Continuous Time Random Walks and fractional in time Hamilton Jacobi Bellman equations»
Abstract. In this paper we study controlled continuous time random walks (CTRWs) and heuristically derive pay-off function dynamic programming (DP) equations which turn in the limit of standard scaling to fractional Hamilton Jacobi Bellman type equations. This paper aims to extend results from [1] in a controlled setting.
Markus Gebauer (Toulouse School of Economics)
«Increasing Firing Costs in a Dual Labour Market Theory and Evidence»
Abstract: This paper presents a search and matching model of dual labour markets. It exhibits higher matching rates and lower surplus for temporary workers, without assuming unob-served ex ante and ex post heterogeneity to motivate the use of different contracts. The model predicts that increases in firing costs lead to a decrease in permanent workers and an increase in wages for permanent workers, whereas hazard rates remain stable. I then empir-ically support these predictions using a regional French policy experiment, the “Contrat de Transition Professionelle”, which increased firing costs of permanent workers in firms below 1000 workers.
* Константин Сонин включен Минюстом в список физлиц, выполняющих функции иностранного агента.