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Книга
BRICS Innovative Competitiveness Report 2017

Bingqing X., Boyang W., Changlin G. et al.

Beijing: China Science and Technology Exchange Center (CSTEC), 2017.

Статья
Guaranteed approach for determining the optimal design of accelerometer unit calibration.

Golovan A. A., Matasov A. I.

Journal of Mathematical Sciences . 2018. Vol. 22. No. 2.

Глава в книге
Hawkes processes for forecasting currency crashes: Evidence from Russia

Egorova L. G., Klymyuk I.

In bk.: Procedia Computer Science. 5th International Conference on Information Technology and Quantitative Management, ITQM 2017. Vol. 122: 5th International Conference on Information Technology and Quantitative Management, ITQM 2017. Elsevier B.V., 2017. P. 1182-1188.

Научный семинар "Политическая экономика"

Мероприятие завершено
19 сентября в 17.00 состоится совместный научный семинар серии «Политическая экономика», Лаборатории исследований социальных отношений и многообразия общества РЭШ (ЛИСОМО РЭШ) и Международного центра изучения институтов и развития НИУ ВШЭ (МЦИИР ВШЭ).

Докладчик: Anne Meng (University of Virginia)

Тема: "Autocratic Constitutions and Leadership Succession in Dictatorial Regimes"

 


Аннотация:

Under what conditions can autocratic regimes undergo successful leadership transitions? The problem of transferring power has long been identified as one of the key challenges of continued authoritarian rule. Two main mechanisms that have emerged as potential solutions for autocratic succession are the presence of a ruling party and the implementation of hereditary succession. However, using a global dataset of autocratic successions from 1946-2015, I show that hereditary successions are incredibly rare in modern dictatorships, and that the presence of a ruling party is not a strong predictor of peaceful leadership succession. Instead, I argue that constitutional rules play a critical role in regulating the process of autocratic succession. I show evidence of this argument using original data on constitutional amendments outlining succession rules and the appointment of a de facto successor in 47 African countries from 1960-2005. I find that regimes that have formal succession rules written into the constitution and leaders who designate a clear successor are significantly more likely to undergo multiple leadership successions – regardless of whether the regime has a long-standing ruling party. Rather than introducing the crown prince problem, planning for leadership succession seems to be a stabilizing force for continued autocratic rule.


Соруководители семинара «Политическая экономика»: Алексей Захаров (НИУ ВШЭ), Константин Сонин (НИУ ВШЭ).

Рабочий язык семинара — английский.

Место проведения семинара: ул. Шаболовка, д. 26, ауд. 4413.

Вход на семинар свободный, приглашаются все желающие. Если Вам необходим пропуск на территорию ВШЭ, напишите до 10.00 на почту семинара political.economy.hse@gmail.com

Страница семинара.