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Статья
On Mathematical Visualization in Education

Karpov A., Klepov V. Y., Nikitin A. A.

Communications in Computer and Information Science. 2020. Vol. 1140. No. 1. P. 11-27.

Глава в книге
Influence of Countries in the Global Arms Transfers Network: 1950–2018

Shvydun S.

In bk.: Studies in Computational Intelligence. Vol. 882: Complex Networks and Their Applications VIII. Part 2. Springer, 2020. P. 736-748.

Препринт
On the dual and inverse problems of scheduling problems with minimizing the maximum job penalty

Alexander A. Lazarev, Вернер Ф., Правдивец Н. А.

Preprint 09/ 19, FMA, OvGU Magdeburg, 2019,. Preprint 09/ 19, FMA, OvGU Magdeburg, 2019,. Otto-von-Guericke-Universität Magdeburg, 2019

Научный семинар "Политическая экономика"

Мероприятие завершено
28 января в 17.00 состоится совместный научный семинар серии «Политическая экономика», Лаборатории исследований социальных отношений и многообразия общества РЭШ (ЛИСОМО РЭШ) и Международного центра изучения институтов и развития НИУ ВШЭ (МЦИИР ВШЭ).

Докладчик: James Tremewan (Auckland University)

Соавторы: Juha Tolvanen (Auckland University), Alexander Wagner (Auckland University)

Тема: Ambiguous Policies and Correlated Preferences

Аннотация:

There are many popular accounts of candidates winning elections with markedly ambiguous platforms. Clear empirical evidence regarding ambiguous platforms as well as the reasons for their attractiveness is however quite limited. We test a novel mechanism that explains the success of ambiguous platforms in an equilibrium model with fully rational players. In a citizen-candidate model of electoral competition, we show that if policy preferences are correlated in a society, this correlation can lead candidates to run on ambiguous platforms and voters to support them. In a laboratory experiment, we show that when voters' and candidates' preferences are correlated, ambiguous platforms gain notable support and can even win elections. Moreover, leveraging on the heterogeneity of cognitive ability of players in the game, we provide direct support for the underlying mechanism which drives the use and support of ambiguous platforms.

Рабочий язык семинара — английский.

Место проведения семинара: Покровский бульвар 11, корп. S, ауд. S1013.

Вход на семинар свободный, приглашаются все желающие. Если Вам необходим пропуск на территорию ВШЭ, напишите до 12.00 на почту семинара political.economy.hse@gmail.com

Страница семинара.