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Книга
Recent Advances of the Russian Operations Research Society

Под науч. редакцией: F. T. Aleskerov, А. А. Васин.

Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2020.

Статья
Stability of implicit difference schemes for a linearized hyperbolic quasi-gasdynamic system of equations
В печати

Zlotnik A.A., Chetverushkin B.

Differential Equations. 2020. Vol. 56. No. 7. P. 910-922.

Глава в книге
Belief Functions for the Importance Assessment in Multiplex Networks

Lepskiy A., Meshcheryakova N.

In bk.: Information Processing and Management of Uncertainty in Knowledge-Based Systems. IPMU 2020. Vol. 1238. Prt. 2. Cham: Springer, 2020. P. 283-296.

Препринт
Matrix-vector approach to construct generalized centrality indices in networks

Aleskerov F. T., Yakuba V. I.

Математические методы анализа решений в экономике, бизнесе и политике. WP7. Высшая школа экономики, 2020. No. 2323.

Состоялось очередное заседание научного семинара "Политическая экономика"

Тема доклада: "Pocketbook vs. Sociotropic Corruption Voting"
Докладчик:  Josh Tucker (New York University)
We theorize and examine the channels by which corruption may affect voting behavior. First, motivated by low empirical correlation between exposure to corruption and perceptions thereof, we postulate two distinct mechanisms: pocketbook corruption voting, defined as the effect of personal experiences with corruption on voting behavior; and sociotropic corruption voting, defined as the effect of perceptions of corruption in one's society on voting behavior. Second, we argue that the weight the voter places on each mechanism depends on the level of certainty about each source of corruption. Since certainty about bribe victimization is inherently high and overall levels of bribe-taking in society are slow-changing, pocketbook corruption voting is expected to be stable. Conversely, certainty about societal corruption is inherently low, but it may be increased in the aggregate electorate by the actions of elites, such as corruption scandals, campaigns, or entry of a new anti-corruption party. Using repeated surveys from Slovakia, we find support for our theoretical arguments. In the absence of events that raise certainty about sociotropic corruption, we only find pocketbook voting. Sociotropic voting, however, is not activated by scandals alone, but it is by the entry of a credible anti-corruption party. We conclude that previous studies may have underestimated the effect of corruption on voting by missing pocketbook effects, but may potentially have been overstating the importance of corruption scandals.

Заседание состоялось 21 .03.2013 в 18.15 по адресу: г. Москва, улица Шаболовка, дом 26, корпус 4, аудитория  4322.

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