• A
  • A
  • A
  • АБB
  • АБB
  • АБB
  • А
  • А
  • А
  • А
  • А
Обычная версия сайта
Recent Advances of the Russian Operations Research Society

Под науч. редакцией: F. T. Aleskerov, А. А. Васин.

Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2020.

Stability of implicit difference schemes for a linearized hyperbolic quasi-gasdynamic system of equations
В печати

Zlotnik A.A., Chetverushkin B.

Differential Equations. 2020. Vol. 56. No. 7. P. 910-922.

Глава в книге
Belief Functions for the Importance Assessment in Multiplex Networks

Lepskiy A., Meshcheryakova N.

In bk.: Information Processing and Management of Uncertainty in Knowledge-Based Systems. IPMU 2020. Vol. 1238. Prt. 2. Cham: Springer, 2020. P. 283-296.

Matrix-vector approach to construct generalized centrality indices in networks

Aleskerov F. T., Yakuba V. I.

Математические методы анализа решений в экономике, бизнесе и политике. WP7. Высшая школа экономики, 2020. No. 2323.

Состоялось очередное заседание научного семинара "Политическая экономика"

Speaker: Rafael  Hortala-Vallve  (London School of Economics and Political Science)
Topic: " Team of Rivals: Learning about a Cabinet and its Shadow "

co-author: Torun Dewan (London School of Economics and Political Science)

We explore electoral accountability in a two-period model in which an incumbent government chooses whether to implement a policy with a known payoff or a "reform" policy that yields higher or lower payoffs (to voters and ministers) depending on whether the minister implementing it is competent or not. An opposition can also reveal information about its average competence via its choice of campaign. Voters cast their votes based on what they learn about the rival teams' relative competence and anticipate collective decisions made by an incoming cabinet. Although collective decision-making in the team induces a hold-up problem --ministers revealed as incompetent will veto the implementation of reform we show that electoral competition between rival teams, as in that between a cabinet and its shadow, provides levels of reform that are always too high from the voters perspective. This can provide perverse incentives for voters to select teams that are on average of lower competence than their opponents. An increase in the qualified majority rule threshold can, surprisingly, increase levels of reform.




Научный семинар "Политическая экономика" состоялся 02 июня (вторник) 2015г. в 18:15
Семинар проводится совместно с РЭШ, соруководители семинара: А.В.Захаров (НИУ ВШЭ), К.И. Сонин (НИУ ВШЭ)