Auctions: Theory and Practice

2025/2026

Учебный год

ENG

Обучение ведется на английском языке

3

Кредиты

Кто читает:

Департамент теоретической экономики

Статус:

Курс по выбору

Когда читается:

2-й курс, 2 модуль

Преподаватель

Андреянов Павел Павлович

Course Syllabus

Abstract

In this course, we will get acquainted with the main auction models: first price, second price, English, scoring, asymmetric and "common value"; we will learn how to find and compare profits. The main textbook is "Krishna, Auction Theory".

Learning Objectives

• Find equilibria in I- and II- price auctions.
• Find equilibria in affiliated values auctions
• Find equilibria in scoring auctions
• Compare revenue and bidder surplus across various formats
• Learn to use theory to estimate an auction model
• Discuss other auction models: asymmetric, with binding constraints.

Expected Learning Outcomes

• be able to estimate and simulate simple auction models
• be able to make a presentation
• be able to set and solve simple auction models

Course Contents

• Course overview and auctions taxonomy
• Equilibria in I-price and II-price auctions
• Introduction to mechanism design
• Efficiency vs optimality, reserve prices
• Scoring auctions, Double auctions
• English auctions, common value
• Collusion, Corruption
• Confronting your model with the data

Assessment Elements

• Attendance
  This activity will consist of two ingredients. First, it is the attendance with the weight of 10%. Second, it is the participation in the class discussions, the weight is 5%. The total weight is 15%.
• Theoretical HW
• Practical HW
• Final test
  There will be a retake.

Interim Assessment

• 2025/2026 2nd module
  0.15 * Theoretical HW + 0.5 * Final test + 0.2 * Practical HW + 0.15 * Attendance

Bibliography

Recommended Core Bibliography

• An introduction to auction theory, Menezes, F. M., 2005
• Auction theory, Krishna, V., 2002
• Auction theory, Krishna, V., 2010
• Auctions: theory and practice, Klemperer, P., 2004
• Che, Y. K. (1991). Design Competition through Multidimensional Auctions. Working Papers. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.p.att.wimass.9123
• Krishna, V. (2010). Auction Theory (Vol. 2nd ed). Burlington, MA: Academic Press. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsebk&AN=297062
• Paul Klemperer. (2004). Auctions: Theory and Practice. SUNY-Oswego, Department of Economics. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.b.oet.tbooks.auction1
• Porter, R. H., & Zona, J. D. (1993). Detection of Bid Rigging in Procurement Auctions. Journal of Political Economy, (3), 518. https://doi.org/10.1086/261885

Recommended Additional Bibliography

• Auctions, Hubbard, T. P., 2015

Authors

• Tarasov Aleksandr Igorevich
• Andreianov Pavel Pavlovich