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Regular version of the site

109028, Moscow
11 Pokrovsky Boulevard,
Room Т-614
Phone: (495) 628-83-68

Academic Supervisor Konstantin Sonin
First Deputy Dean Sergey Merzlyakov
Deputy Dean for Academic Work Elena Pokatovich
Deputy Dean for Research Daniel Karabekyan
Deputy Dean for International Affairs Ludmila S. Zasimova
Deputy Dean for Undergraduate Studies Elena Burmistrova
On Mathematical Visualization in Education

Karpov A., Klepov V. Y., Nikitin A. A.

Communications in Computer and Information Science. 2020. Vol. 1140. No. 1. P. 11-27.

Book chapter
Opportunistic Behavior in Public Procurement

Yakovlev A. A., Tkachenko A., Rodionova Y.

In bk.: Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy, and Governance. Springer, 2020. P. 1-5.

Working paper
Set-Asides: The Not-So-Clear Side of Public Procurement

Shadrina E. V., Dmitry V. Kashin, Dmitri V. Vinogradov.

Working Papers. SSRN, 2020

FES International Research Seminar Series with David Rahman, University of Minnesota

*recommended age
Event ended

Our next speaker in the FES International Seminar Series is David Rahman who is an Associate Professor at University of Minnesota.

His main research interest focuses on contract theory, repeated games, general equilibrium, game theory, mechanism design, experiments.

Speaker:David Rahman

Title: Frequent Actions with Infrequent Coordination

Abstract: I study repeated games with mediated communication and frequent actions. I derive Folk Theorems with imperfect public and private monitoring under minimal detectability assumptions. Even in the limit, when noise is driven by Brownian motion and actions are arbitrarily frequent, as long as players are sufficiently patient they can attain virtually efficient equilibrium outcomes, in two ways: secret monitoring and infrequent coordination. Players follow private strategies over discrete blocks of time. A mediator constructs latent Brownian motions to score players on the basis of others’ secret monitoring, and gives incentives with these variables at the end of each block to economize on the cost of providing incentives. This brings together the work on repeated games in discrete and continuous time in that, despite actions being continuous, strategic coordination is endogenously discrete. As an application, I show how individual full rank is necessary and sufficient for the Folk Theorem in the Prisoners’ Dilemma regardless of whether monitoring is public or private. 

Date: January 24, 2020

Time: 12:10 – 13:30

Venue: Pokrovka campus, room T510 (109028, Moscow,  Pokrovsky Boulevard 11

Working language: English

For external participants:   to order the pass, please contact Disa Malbakhova dmalbakhova@hse.ru