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109028, Moscow,
11 Pokrovsky Boulevard,
Room Т-614
Phone: (495) 628-83-68
email: fes@hse.ru
Founded in 1992, the HSE Faculty of Economics is the university’s oldest faculty. In the years since it was founded, it has gained a reputation as Russia’s leader in terms of higher economic education.
A fundamental education in modern economic theory and mathematics is combined with the study of applied disciplines, such as taxation, budget policies and processes, financial management and other related fields.
Applied Econometrics. 2024.
In bk.: Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Economics and Finance. Oxford University Press, 2024.
Dagaev D., Paklina S., Parshakov P.
Social Science Research Network. Social Science Research Network. SSRN, 2024
Our next speaker in the FES International Seminar Series is David Rahman who is an Associate Professor at University of Minnesota.
His main research interest focuses on contract theory, repeated games, general equilibrium, game theory, mechanism design, experiments.
Speaker:David Rahman
Title: Frequent Actions with Infrequent Coordination
Abstract: I study repeated games with mediated communication and frequent actions. I derive Folk Theorems with imperfect public and private monitoring under minimal detectability assumptions. Even in the limit, when noise is driven by Brownian motion and actions are arbitrarily frequent, as long as players are sufficiently patient they can attain virtually efficient equilibrium outcomes, in two ways: secret monitoring and infrequent coordination. Players follow private strategies over discrete blocks of time. A mediator constructs latent Brownian motions to score players on the basis of others’ secret monitoring, and gives incentives with these variables at the end of each block to economize on the cost of providing incentives. This brings together the work on repeated games in discrete and continuous time in that, despite actions being continuous, strategic coordination is endogenously discrete. As an application, I show how individual full rank is necessary and sufficient for the Folk Theorem in the Prisoners’ Dilemma regardless of whether monitoring is public or private.
Date: January 24, 2020
Time: 12:10 – 13:30
Venue: Pokrovka campus, room T510 (109028, Moscow, Pokrovsky Boulevard 11
Working language: English
For external participants: to order the pass, please contact Disa Malbakhova dmalbakhova@hse.ru