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Regular version of the site
ФКН
Contacts

119049, Moscow
28 Shabolovka Ulitsa, Building 2,
Room 211, 212
Phone: (495) 772-95-99 ext.26009, 26016, 26047, 26190

 

Department Head — Svetlana Avdasheva

 

Deputy Head of Department — Ludmila Zasimova 

 

Manager — Maxim Shevelev

Phone: (967) 170-0219

Article
Modeling the Employment Rate in Russia: a Spatial-Econometric Approach

Demidova O., Daddi P., Medvedeva E. et al.

Economy of Region. 2018. Vol. 14. No. 4. P. 1383-1398.

Book chapter
Industrial and Innovation Policy

Yuri Simachev, Mikhail Kuzyk.

In bk.: Russia: Strategy, Policy and Administration. L.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018. Ch. 17. P. 183-194.

Working paper
Wage Adjustment Policies In Russian Firms

Solntsev S., Roshchin S., Ksenia Rozhkova.

Economics/EC. WP BRP. Высшая школа экономики, 2018. No. 205.

Department of Applied Economics' Academic seminar - Dagmara Celik, "Persistent overconfidence: evidence from a randomized control trial in Uganda"

Event ended

Dear colleagues,

 Department of Applied Economics  invites you to attend the academic seminar that will be held on 17 May, 2018  at 1.40 p.m.  Venue -  Moscow, Shabolovka 28/11, room 2206.

Speaker:  Dagmara Celik, Assistant Professor of our Department.

 Her presentation's topic:  "Persistent overconfidence: evidence from a randomized control trial in Uganda"
 
 
Working language - English.                       

Abstract:
" Overconfidence is an important and probably most prevalent behavioral bias observed in different domains and may have economic consequences. While the reasons why we are overconfident have been widely discussed across various disciplines (see literature review for further details), the evidence on how to lower subjects’ overconfidence is mixed and we still do not have a clear answer to what would help us to lower our inaccuracy in self-assessment. Although informing subjects about their own performance has been shown to decrease their inflated estimations (e.g., Ryvkin et al., 2012), subjects remain overconfident (e.g., Lipko et al., 2009). A possible explanation is that they have insufficient information about others. In this paper I bring evidence from a large scale field experiment on whether complex information set about own performance and the performance of peers – in and in the absence of a tournament - would help to close the overconfidence gaps. Furthermore, little is known about the trade-offs of being overconfident and the consequences of confidence calibration. I bring suggestive evidence, to my best knowledge first of its type, on how change in confidence gap turns into performance change and how such “updating” influences other outcomes, such as students’ stress, happiness and students’ dropouts. The design also gives me the opportunity to document that the “unskilled-and-unaware phenomenon” is a behavioral bias rather than a statistical artifact ".

the event is open for anyone interested. Those who need pass for HSE please contact Maxim Shevelev, mshevelev@hse.ru, tel. +7-495-7729590 ext.26190