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Regular version of the site
109028, Moscow
Pokrovsky blvd. 11,
Room S-527
Phone: (495) 772-95-99 ext.27502, 27503, 27498
Administration
Department Head
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Svetlana B. Avdasheva
Deputy Department Head
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Liudmila S. Zasimova
Manager
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Maxim Shevelev
Events
Apr 26 – Apr 27
Book
In press
Yudkevich Maria, Altbach P. G., Salmi J.
Cambridge: MIT Press, 2023.
Article
In press
Applied Econometrics. 2024.
Book chapter
In press
In bk.: Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Economics and Finance. Oxford University Press, 2024.
Working paper
Living Standards in the USSR during the Interwar Period
Economics/EC. WP BRP. Высшая школа экономики, 2023. No. 264.
CInSt Research Seminar "Bidding on price and quality: An experiment on the complexity of scoring auctions": Riccardo Camboni (University of Padova)
Event ended
Riccardo Camboni will present his paper "Bidding on price and quality: An experiment on the complexity of scoring auctions" on the regular CInSt research seminar on 23th April
Speaker: Riccardo Camboni, Post-Doc Researcher (University of Padova)Abstract
We run an experiment on procurement auctions in a setting where both quality and price matter. We compare two unidimensional treatments in which the buyer fixes one dimension (quality or price) and sellers compete on the other, with three bidimensional treatments (with different strategy spaces) in which sellers submit a price-quality bid and the winner is determined by a score that linearly combines the two offers. We find that, with respect to the theoretical predictions, the bidimensional treatments significantly underperform, both in terms of efficiency and buyer’s utility. We attribute this result to the higher strategic complexity of these treatments and test this intuition by fitting a structural Quantal Response Equilibrium model with risk aversion to our experimental data. We find very similar estimates for the risk aversion parameter across all treatments; instead, the error parameter, which captures deviations between the observed bids and the payoff-maximizing ones, is larger in the bidimensional treatments than in the unidimensional ones. Our evidence suggests that increasing the dimensionality and the size of the suppliers’ strategy space increases their tendency to make suboptimal offers, thus undermining the theoretical superiority of more complex mechanisms.
Date: April 23rd, 2019, 17:00-18:30.
Location: Online in Zoom
Working language: English.
The link to join Zoom: https://zoom.us/j/7488279147
Here is the instruction about how to join the seminar in Zoom: https://cinst.hse.ru/news/350230570.html
Date
April 23, 2020 17:00
Address
Online in Zoom