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109028, Moscow,
Pokrovsky Boulevard 11, Rooms: S1029, S1030
Phone: +7 (495) 772-95-90*27172, 27174, 27601, 28270
The Department of Theoretical Economics brings together highly qualified specialists in various fields of economics, including micro and macroeconomics, monetary and financial theory, economic history and the history of economic thought. Our mission is to teach economic disciplines at HSE on the level of leading Western universities.
Shchepeleva M., Stolbov M., Parfenov D.
Economics Letters. 2025. Vol. 250. P. 1-8.
In bk.: Human-Centric Decision and Negotiation Support for Societal Transitions: 24th International Conference on Group Decision and Negotiation, GDN 2024, Porto, Portugal, June 3–5, 2024, Proceedings. Cham: Springer, 2024. P. 102-113.
Andreyanov P., Krasikov I., Suzdaltsev A.
arxiv.org. Theoretical Economics. Cornell University, 2024
Dear colleagues,
Department of Theoretical Economics invites you to attend the research seminar with Aleksei Smirnov, HSE
Date: June 17, 2025
Time: 1:00 p.m.
Working language: English
Speaker: Aleksei Smirnov, Assistant Professor of the Department of Theoretical Economics
The link to the seminar
Title: Experimentation with Private Payoffs
Abstract: I study strategic experimentation game between two players whose efforts are mutually observable, but the payoffs are private. Player's exerted effort reveals her past private payoff allowing the amount of private information between the players to stay limited on equilibrium path. Players benefit from the additional effort of the counterpart and thus can be interested in manipulating the effort of the other player with the strategic choice of their own effort. I show that the possibility of such manipulation may additionally increase the effort level after high private payoffs.