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Contacts

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Phone: +7 (495) 772-95-90*27172, 27174, 27601, 28270 

Department Administration
Department Head Alexander Tarasov

PhD, Penn State University

Deputy Head Svetlana Seregina
Senior Administrator Elizaveta Volodina
Senior Administrator Natalia Baibouzenko
Administrator Marina Yudina
Article
What is the relationship between biodiversity and the frequency of financial crises? Global evidence

Shchepeleva M., Stolbov M., Parfenov D.

Economics Letters. 2025. Vol. 250. P. 1-8.

Book chapter
Evaluation of the Degree of Manipulability of Positional Aggregation Procedures in a Dynamic Voting Model

Karabekyan D., Yakuba V. I.

In bk.: Human-Centric Decision and Negotiation Support for Societal Transitions: 24th International Conference on Group Decision and Negotiation, GDN 2024, Porto, Portugal, June 3–5, 2024, Proceedings. Cham: Springer, 2024. P. 102-113.

Working paper
Scoring and Favoritism in Optimal Procurement Design

Andreyanov P., Krasikov I., Suzdaltsev A.

arxiv.org. Theoretical Economics. Cornell University, 2024

Department of Theoretical Economics Research Seminar with Aleksei Smirnov, HSE

12+
*recommended age
Event ended

Dear colleagues,  

Department of Theoretical Economics invites you to attend the research seminar with Aleksei Smirnov, HSE

Date: June 17, 2025
Time: 1:00 p.m.
Working language: English
Speaker: Aleksei Smirnov, Assistant Professor of the Department of Theoretical Economics

The link to the seminar

TitleExperimentation with Private Payoffs 

Abstract: I study strategic experimentation game between two players whose efforts are mutually observable, but the payoffs are private. Player's exerted effort reveals her past private payoff allowing the amount of private information between the players to stay limited on equilibrium path. Players benefit from the additional effort of the counterpart and thus can be interested in manipulating the effort of the other player with the strategic choice of their own effort. I show that the possibility of such manipulation may additionally increase the effort level after high private payoffs.