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Regular version of the site

109028, Moscow,
Pokrovsky Boulevard 11, Rooms: S1029, S1030
Phone: +7 (495) 772-95-90*27172, 27173, 27174

Department Head Alexander Tarasov

PhD, University of Pennsylvania

Deputy Head Svetlana Seregina
Manager Disa Malbakhova
Senior Administrator Natalia Baibouzenko
Administrator Marina Yudina
Book chapter
The Complexity of Election Problems with Group-Separable Preferences

Karpov A. V., Obraztsova S., Faliszewski P.

In bk.: Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-20). International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence, 2020. P. 203-209.

Working paper
Commodity Cycles and Financial Instability in Emerging Economies

Andreev M., Peiris U., Shirobokov A. et al.

WORKING PAPER SERIES. 57. Bank of Russia, 2020. No. 57.

Department of Theoretical Economics Research Seminar with Postgraduate Student and Assistant Vladimir Schukin, HSE

*recommended age
Event ended

Department of Theoretical Economics invites you to attend the research seminar with Postgraduate Student  Vladimir Schukin, HSE

Date: May 26, 2020
Time: 1:40 p.m.
Working language: English
Speaker: Vladimir Schukin, Postgraduate Student of the Department of Theoretical Economics 


The link to Zoom: https://zoom.us/j/96772969416

Title: "Clientelism and development: Vote-buying meets patronage"

Abstract: Offering employment in the public sector in exchange for electoral support (patronage politics) and vote buying are clientelist practices frequently used by political machines. In the literature, these practices are typically studied in isolation. In this paper, we study how the interaction between these two practices (as opposed to having just one tool) affects economic development. We present a theoretical model of political competition, where, prior to election, the incumbent chooses the level of state investment which can improve productivity in the private sector. This decision affects income levels of employees in the private sector, and, thereby, the costs and effectiveness of vote-buying and patronage. We show, that when the politician can use both clientelist instruments simultaneously, his opportunity cost per vote secured declines because these tools can complement more than substitute each other. Furthermore, if rents to office is sufficiently high, the equilibrium level of state investment also declines.