Pokrovsky Boulevard 11, Rooms: S1029, S1030
Phone: +7 (495) 772-95-90*27172, 27173, 27174
PhD, University of Pennsylvania
The Department of Theoretical Economics brings together highly qualified specialists in various fields of economics, including micro and macroeconomics, monetary and financial theory, economic history and the history of economic thought. Our mission is to teach economic disciplines at HSE on the level of leading Western universities.
Melnik D. V.
Edward Elgar Publishing, 2020.
Karpov A. V.
Social Choice and Welfare. 2020. P. 1-16.
Karpov A. V., Obraztsova S., Faliszewski P.
In bk.: Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-20). International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence, 2020. P. 203-209.
Andreev M., Peiris U., Shirobokov A. et al.
WORKING PAPER SERIES. 57. Bank of Russia, 2020. No. 57.
Department of Theoretical Economics invites you to attend the research seminar with Postgraduate Student Vladimir Schukin, HSEDate: May 26, 2020Time: 1:40 p.m.Working language: EnglishSpeaker: Vladimir Schukin, Postgraduate Student of the Department of Theoretical Economics
The link to Zoom: https://zoom.us/j/96772969416
Title: "Clientelism and development: Vote-buying meets patronage"
Abstract: Offering employment in the public sector in exchange for electoral support (patronage politics) and vote buying are clientelist practices frequently used by political machines. In the literature, these practices are typically studied in isolation. In this paper, we study how the interaction between these two practices (as opposed to having just one tool) affects economic development. We present a theoretical model of political competition, where, prior to election, the incumbent chooses the level of state investment which can improve productivity in the private sector. This decision affects income levels of employees in the private sector, and, thereby, the costs and effectiveness of vote-buying and patronage. We show, that when the politician can use both clientelist instruments simultaneously, his opportunity cost per vote secured declines because these tools can complement more than substitute each other. Furthermore, if rents to office is sufficiently high, the equilibrium level of state investment also declines.