Department of Theoretical Economics Research Seminar with Postgraduate Student and Assistant Vladimir Schukin, HSE

Department of Theoretical Economics invites you to attend the research seminar with Postgraduate Student  Vladimir Schukin, HSE

Date: May 26, 2020
Time: 1:40 p.m.
Working language: English
Speaker: Vladimir Schukin, Postgraduate Student of the Department of Theoretical Economics 

The link to Zoom: https://zoom.us/j/96772969416

Title: "Clientelism and development: Vote-buying meets patronage"

Abstract: Offering employment in the public sector in exchange for electoral support (patronage politics) and vote buying are clientelist practices frequently used by political machines. In the literature, these practices are typically studied in isolation. In this paper, we study how the interaction between these two practices (as opposed to having just one tool) affects economic development. We present a theoretical model of political competition, where, prior to election, the incumbent chooses the level of state investment which can improve productivity in the private sector. This decision affects income levels of employees in the private sector, and, thereby, the costs and effectiveness of vote-buying and patronage. We show, that when the politician can use both clientelist instruments simultaneously, his opportunity cost per vote secured declines because these tools can complement more than substitute each other. Furthermore, if rents to office is sufficiently high, the equilibrium level of state investment also declines.