

# Lecture 4

# THE REFORM OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM

Lectures in the Theory of Interest and Monetary Policy

Higher School of Economics Moscow November 2021

Jan Toporowski

# Summary

- 1. 'Legacy' Problems**
- 2. Elimination of 'Macroeconomic Imbalances'**
- 3. Currency swaps**
- 4. Special Drawing Rights**
- 5. Return of the Keynes Plan?**
- 6. International Debt and Liquidity Management**

# 1. Legacy Problems

The international monetary system consists of:

- international payments system (depends on convertibility);
- System of 'inherited' international credit and debt ('legacy') requiring servicing and refinancing.

Dilemma of assuring payments + dealing with 'legacy' issues.

Vs. new start without 'legacy'.

# 'Legacy' problems

- International debt of Low Income Countries (mainly Africa, reduced by Highly-Indebted Poor Countries – HIPC Initiative 1990s; Sustainable Development Goals 2000; Addis Ababa Action Agenda 2015); External indebtedness of poor countries rose by 73% between 2013 (\$300bn.) and 2019.
- Eurobond Issue of low and Middle Income Countries (since 2008...)

# Structures of international credit and debt

- Private Sector foreign indebtedness of middle income countries (Latin America – private sector debt is still claim on government foreign exchange reserves) (but capital controls in China, India and South Africa);
- Covid effects: Rising indebtedness of governments in rich countries (over 100% of GDP) and jump in poor countries' government debt from 29% GDP in 2012 to 49% in 2020. Debt Service Suspension Initiative of G20 governments in May 2020 extended official debt payments of 73 poorest country governments to July 2021.
- But G20 does not speak for all official creditors – China operates independently.

# In the context of:

- Rising expenditure demands on governments for Covid medical emergency and employment while restricting carbon emissions;
- Low export commodity prices;
- Populist pressures to reduce aid to poorer countries.

## 2. Elimination of 'Macroeconomic Imbalances'

- Favoured solution of Bretton Woods institutions and fiscal conservatives>
- Macroeconomic imbalances: fiscal and trade deficits;

i.e., if

$$S - I = (G - T) + (X - M)$$

and terms on right hand side = 0 then

$$S = I$$

## Obstacles to elimination of imbalances

- Does not deal with legacy of debt, (medical emergency, commodity price super-cycle etc.)
- Any trade surplus to service/pay down foreign debt creates deficit elsewhere in the system.
- Utopian to expect trade balance in all countries.
- Elimination of *fiscal* deficit overlooks distinction between internal (domestic) debt and external debt.

### 3. Currency swaps

Swap (repurchase) agreements between *central* banks;

Vs. Foreign exchange swaps of *commercial* banks:

Central banks create *bank reserves* that they exchange with other central banks using repo agreements;

Commercial banks create *bank deposits* that they exchange with other commercial banks using repo agreements.

# Role of Federal Reserve Bank of New York

Federal Reserve announces list of the central banks that have access to Fed currency swaps, namely:

Central banks of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, European Monetary Union, UK, Sweden, Denmark;

among emerging markets only central banks of Mexico, South Korea and Singapore.

Currency swaps reinforced since Covid in March 2020.

# Effective extension of US dollar zone

- Dependence on US foreign policy

# 4. Special Drawing Rights

Basket currency held by IMF. Issued in proportion to IMF quotas.

So, allocation of \$650bn on 23 August 2021 is split:

Advanced economies: \$376bn;

Emerging markets: \$253bn;

Low income countries \$21bn;

(Russian Federation \$17.6bn)

# But...

Make up less than 3% of non-gold reserves (\$ more than half);

Mostly benefits rich countries;

Political process of issue prevents use of SDR's to regulate liquidity in international monetary system;

May only be used for payments between governments and IMF;

But would free up dollars from reserves for use in more general financial circulation.

# 5. Return of the Keynes Plan?

Keynes's 'Bancor' allocation on a much greater scale than SDRs.

'Legacy' situation of 1944 very different to 2021: No private foreign debt.

Overlooks opposition to Keynes Plan from US (White Plan; Williams proposals) and developing countries (Kalecki-Prebisch): Bretton Woods agreement was not global.

# 6. International Debt and Liquidity Management

- Governments need to maintain existing levels of (non-financial) expenditure to prevent deflation and internal private sector debt default;
- Additional expenditure needed for Covid (care, income replacement and recovery);
- Additional climate change expenditure (to limit carbon and methane emissions).

Paying for new expenditure:

Fiscal imbalances to be addressed by increased taxes on wealth and higher incomes (with investment allowances – Kalecki 1954);

# Fiscal deficit financing in domestic markets at long-term maturities

Government can set the terms for domestic debt;

Long-term government bonds as basis for financial development;

Sale of long-term bonds absorbs excess liquidity from financial markets ('sterilization') to prevent dollarization and exchange rate instability;

Require permanent policy of central bank open market operations (buying and selling bonds) to regulate liquidity in domestic financial system.

# Foreign aid?

Foreign aid needed to maintain expenditure  
in less developed countries

(to prevent defaults in private and  
government sectors).

# Difficulties

Domestic borrowing discouraged by excess liquidity in international monetary system (esp. since 2008)

+ doctrine of 'saving deficiency' in poorer countries (classic, neo-classical economics, Thirlwall).

## In practice....

Institutional mechanism may be needed for converting excess foreign borrowing into domestic currency debt:

- Mexican reliance in late 1980s on capital inflow to refinance government debt from \$ to domestic pesos, burdened Mexican corporations privatised in this way with foreign debt.

# Conclusion

- All global solutions have utopian elements.
- Regional solutions may work better (e.g., European Monetary System with reformed Franc Zone).