# Choking under pressure in relay races

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Roberto Baggio misses decisive shoot-out during 1994 FIFA World Cup



### 1993 Wimbledon Championship

Steffi Graf	7	1	1	(15)	
Jana Novotna	6	6	4	(40)	$\bigcirc$

Steffi Graf	7	1	6
Jana Novotna	6	6	4

### Literature review

1900s	Yerkes-Dodson law (1908): performance increases with (mental) are this threshold, performance declines	ousal, but only up to a point; beyond													
1980s	<b>Baumeister (1984):</b> defined "choking under pressure": the performance decrement happens as a result of "increased attention to one's own performance", which is typical reaction of agents being under pressure														
2010s	Ariely (2009): through set of experiments concluded, that "high reware on performance; Sanders and Walia (2012): observed "shirking under stakes could lead to lower performance level in the presence of press	rd levels can have detrimental effects er pressure" effect, when higher sure													
2000- 2020	Economics (sport economics): finding evidence, quantifying, etc.	<b>Psychology:</b> Why does choking happen? How to resolve it?													
	<ul> <li>Friendly environment pressure:</li> <li>Soccer penalty shoot-outs (Dohmen (2008)), biathlon shooting stage (Harb-Wu &amp; Krumer (2019)), basketball (Boheim (2019))</li> </ul>	Choking mechanism and interventions: • Hill et al. (2010), Gropel &													
	"Follower" pressure:	Mesagno (2019): primary													
	<ul> <li>Soccer penalties (Echenique &amp; Rodriguez (2017)) vs. tennis tie- break (Cohen-Zada (2018))</li> </ul>	specific interventions (distraction based, self-focus													
	Decisive moments pressure:	based, mindfulness													
	<ul> <li>Cao et al. (2011): being at final stage of a very close basketball game decreases shooting accuracy by 5-10%</li> <li>Hiskman et al. (2010). Taggalink et al. (2020): suidance of</li> </ul>	intervention, etc.) to prevent performance decrement under pressure in sport													
	• Fickman et al. (2019), reeselink et al. (2020): evidence of performance decrements in decisive moments in darts, golf														



### Agenda

Theoretical modelling

Computer simulations

### Model setup and "normal conditions" case

#### Model setup

2x2 relay race

• Team A: A1, A2, Team B: B1, B2

Players with differentiated skills:

- Ranking:  $A1 \ge B1 \ge B2 \ge A2$
- Meaning t\*(A1) ≤ t\*(B1) ≤ t\*(B2) ≤ t\*(A2), where t\* is time of the lap in "normal conditions"<sup>1</sup>

Coaches choose sequence of players (e.g.  $A1 \rightarrow A2 \text{ or } A2 \rightarrow A1$ )

Lemma 0: Coaches are indifferent of sequence of their players under "normal conditions"

Individual sportsmen time of the lap is predetermined by his / her ranking and would be the same regardless the order in race

$$T_{A1\to A2} = t_{A1} + t_{A2} = \frac{\bar{S}}{\bar{v}_{A1}} + \frac{\bar{S}}{\bar{v}_{A2}} \qquad (=) \qquad T_{A2\to A1} = t_{A2} + t_{A1} = \frac{\bar{S}}{\bar{v}_{A2}} + \frac{$$



<sup>1. &</sup>quot;Normal conditions" means the absence of "choking under pressure" effect, i.e. there is no negative impact on sportsmen performance from other participants of the race. It means, that in "normal conditions" sportsmen shows his / her peak performance. Assume, that vi – peak speed of the sportsmen with ranking i in "normal conditions": that constant speed over the lap leads to performance in "normal conditions" with t\* time of the lap

### "Choking" function

## Baumeister (1984) directionally suggested the form of choking function

- If one is far ahead, one can afford some errors without losing; pressure is minimal
- If one has only a slight lead, the pressure is increased, although an occasional or minor error will keep the contest still undecided
- Pressure would seem to be greatest if one is slightly to moderately behind. In that situation, one retains the possibility of success only if one performs very well; any further mistakes or setbacks may end one's chance of winning
- If one is far behind, pressure is presumably diminished

## Two symmetric "choking" functions are introduced and considered in the paper

• "Choking": negative effect on momentum speed in decisive moments (when the competitor is close)



Potential for future research: functional form of "choking" function (incl. asymmetric to account for Baumeister's (1984) effects)

### Scenario 1: Team A is stronger

Simplified model<sup>1</sup>



Lemma 1a:

- Coach would prefer  $A1 \rightarrow A2$
- Faster to start, slower to finish

#### **Proof (in a nutshell):**

- $T(A1 \rightarrow A2) < T(A2 \rightarrow A1)$
- $\delta_1 \delta_3 < \delta_2 \delta_4$
- $\delta_1 \delta_3 < 0$  (overtaking)
- $\delta_2 \delta_4 > 0$  (no overtaking)

<sup>1.</sup> Assumptions: simplified "choking function"; "choking" effect is for Team A only; theta1 > theta2 > u, v(B1) = v(B2) = v

### Scenario 1 [Proof]: Team A is stronger

Simplified model<sup>1</sup>

$$\delta_1-\delta_3<\delta_2-\delta_4$$

#### Lemma 1a:

- Coach would prefer  $A1 \rightarrow A2$
- Faster to start, slower to finish

#### 1. Assumptions: simplified "choking function"; "choking" effect is for Team A only; theta1 > theta2 > u , v(B1) = v(B2) = v

### Scenario 2: Team A is weaker

Simplified model<sup>1</sup>



Lemma 1a:

- Coach would prefer  $A2 \rightarrow A1$
- Slower to start, faster to finish

#### **Proof (in a nutshell):**

- $T(A1 \rightarrow A2) > T(A2 \rightarrow A1)$
- $\delta_1 \delta_3 > \delta_2 \delta_4$
- $\delta_1 \delta_3 > 0$  (no overtaking)
- $\delta_2 \delta_4 < 0$  (overtaking)

### Agenda

Theoretical modelling

**Computer simulations** 

#### **Computer simulations setup**

#### Main input

#### Speed in "normal conditions"

• v(A1), v(A2), v(B1), v(B2)

#### "Choking" function form:

• Quadratic function

Normal distribution of "choking" value

• Mean: "Choking" function value

Number of simulations

#### Modelling approach

- 1) At time 0 first sportsmen from both teams starts the race (initially distance between them is equal to 0)
- 2) "Choking" function is calculated for specific distance between sportsmen for both of them
- 3) Negative impact on sportsmen speed is randomly realized
- 4) Momentum speed for both sportsmen is determined
- 5) Sportsmen "move", setting new distance between sportsmen
- 6) Return to step (2)

### **Computer simulations results**

 $B1 \rightarrow B2$ ,  $v(B1) = v(B2)^1$ 



### Best response (1/3)

 $B1 \rightarrow B2$ ,  $v(B1) = v(B2)^1$ 

		V0_A2																								
		2.7	2.725	2.75	2.775	2.8	2.825	2.85	2.875	2.9	2.925	2.95	2.975	3	3.025	3.05	3.075	3.1	3.125	3.15	3.175	3.2	3.225	3.25	3.275	3.3
V0_A1	2.7																							Indifferent	Indifferent I	ndifferent
	2.725																							Indifferent	Indifferent I	ndifferent
	2.75																					Indifferen	t Indifferent	Indifferent	Indifferent	A2->A1
	2.775																			Indifferen	t Indifferent	t Indifferen	t Indifferent	A2->A1	A2->A1	ndifferent
	2.8																		Indifferent	Indifferen	t Indifferent	t Indifferen	t A2->A1	A2->A1	Indifferent I	ndifferent
	2.825																1	Indifferent	Indifferent	Indifferen	t A2-≻A1	A2->A1	A2->A1	Indifferent	Indifferent	
	2.85																Indifferent	Indifferent	Indifferent	A2->A1	A2->A1	Indifferen	t Indifferent	Indifferent		
	2.875														Indifferent	Indifferent	t Indifferent	Indifferent	A2->A1	A2->A1	A2->A1	Indifferen	t Indifferent			
	2.9													Indifferen	Indifferent	Indifferent	t A2->A1	A2->A1	A2->A1	Indifferen	t Indifferent	t Indifferen	t			
	2.925												Indifferent	Indifferen	Indifferent	Indifferent	t A2->A1	A2->A1	Indifferent	Indifferen	t Indifferent	t				
	2.95											Indifferent	Indifferent	Indifferen	Indifferent	A2->A1	A2->A1	Indifferent	Indifferent	Indifferen	t					
	2.975										Indifferent	Indifferent	Indifferent	A2->A1	A2->A1	A2->A1	Indifferent	Indifferent	Indifferent							
	3									Indifferent	t Indifferent	Indifferent	A1->A2	Indifferen	A2->A1	Indifferent	t Indifferent	Indifferent								
	3.025								Indifferent	Indifferent	t Indifferent	A1-≻A2	A1->A2	A1->A2	Indifferent	Indifferent	t Indifferent									
	3.05						I	Indifferent	t Indifferent	Indifferent	t Indifferent	A1->A2	A1->A2	Indifferen	Indifferent	Indifferent	t									
	3.075						Indifferent I	Indifferent	t Indifferent	Indifferent	t A1->A2	A1-≻A2	Indifferent	Indifferen	Indifferent											
	3.1				li li	ndifferent	Indifferent I	Indifferent	t A1-≻A2	A1->A2	A1->A2	Indifferent	Indifferent	t												
	3.125				li li	ndifferent	Indifferent	Indifferent	t A1-≻A2	A1->A2	Indifferent	Indifferent														
	3.15				Indifferent l	ndifferent	Indifferent	A1->A2	A1->A2	Indifferent	t Indifferent															
	3.175		l.	ndifferent	Indifferent l	ndifferent	Indifferent	A1->A2	A1->A2	Indifferent	t															
	3.2		Indifferentl	ndifferent	Indifferent	A1->A2	A1->A2	Indifferent	t Indifferent																	
	3.225	Indifferen	t Indifferent l	ndifferent	Indifferent	A1->A2	A1->A2	Indifferent	t																	
	3.25	Indifferen	t Indifferent l	ndifferent	A1->A2	A1->A2	Indifferent																			
	3.275	Indifferen	t Indifferent	A1->A2	A1->A2	ndifferent																				
	3.3	Indifferen	t Indifferent	A1->A2	A1->A2	ndifferent																				

Team A coach would prefer faster to start, slower to finish (A1  $\rightarrow$  A2, if v(A1) > v(A2))

### Best response (2/3)

 $B1 \rightarrow B2$ , v(B1) < v(B2)<sup>1</sup>

		V0_A2																								
		2.7	2.725	2.75	2.775	2.8	2.825	2.85	2.875	2.9	2.925	2.95	2.975	3	3.025	3.05	3.075	3.1	3.125	3.15	3.175	3.2	3.225	3.25	3.275	3.3
V0_A1	2.7																							Indifferent	Indifferent I	ndifferent
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	2.775																			Indifferen	it Indifferen	t Indifferen	t A1->A2	A2->A1	Indifferent I	ndifferent
	2.8																	Indifferent	Indifferen	t Indifferen	t A1->A2	A2->A1	A2->A1	Indifferent	Indifferent	
	2.825																Indifferent	t Indifferent	A1->A2	A1->A2	A2->A1	A2->A1	Indifferent	Indifferent		
	2.85															Indifferent	t Indifferen	t Indifferent	A1->A2	A2->A1	Indifferen	t Indifferen	t Indifferent			
	2.875														Indifferent	Indifferent	t A1-≻A2	A1->A2	A2->A1	Indifferen	t Indifferen	t Indifferen	t			
	2.9													Indifferent	Indifferent	A1->A2	A1-≻A2	A2->A1	Indifferen	t Indifferen	it					
	2.925												Indifferent	Indifferent	A1->A2	A1->A2	A2->A1	Indifferent	Indifferen	t						
	2.95											Indifferent	Indifferent	A1->A2	A2->A1	A2->A1	Indifferent	t Indifferent	Indifferen	t						
-	2.975										Indifferent	Indifferent	A2->A1	A2->A1	Indifferent	Indifferent	t Indifferen	t Indifferent								
-	3								I	ndifferent	t Indifferent	A2->A1	A1->A2	Indifferent	Indifferent	Indifferent	t Indifferen	t								
	3.025								Indifferent I	ndifferent	t A2->A1	A1->A2	A1->A2	Indifferent	Indifferent	Indifferent	t									
	3.05						I	ndifferent	Indifferent	A2->A1	A1->A2	A1->A2	Indifferent	Indifferent	Indifferent											
	3.075						Indifferent I	ndifferent	A2->A1	A2->A1	A1->A2	Indifferent	Indifferent	Indifferent												
	3.1				Ir	ndifferent	Indifferent	A2->A1	A2->A1	A1->A2	Indifferent	Indifferent	Indifferent	t												
	3.125				Ir	ndifferent	Indifferent	A2->A1	A1->A2	ndifferent	t Indifferent	Indifferent														
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	3.2		Indifferent I	ndifferent	A2->A1	A1->A2	A1->A2	ndifferent	Indifferent																	
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	3.25	Indifferent	t Indifferent	A2->A1	A1->A2 Ir	ndifferent	Indifferent																			
	3.275	Indifferent	t A2->A1	A1->A2	Indifferent li	ndifferent																				
	3.3	Indifferent	t A1->A2	A1-≻A2	Indifferent																					

With lower probability of winning: Team A coach would prefer slower to start, faster to finish  $(A2 \rightarrow A1, if v(A1) > v(A2))$ With higher probability of winning: Team A coach would prefer faster to start, slower to finish  $(A1 \rightarrow A2, if v(A1) > v(A2))$ 

#### Best response (2/3) – deep dive for particular speed v(A1) = 3.1 B1 $\rightarrow$ B2, v(B1) < v(B2)<sup>1</sup>



With lower probability of winning: Team A coach would prefer slower to start, faster to finish (A2  $\rightarrow$  A1, if v(A1) > v(A2)) With higher probability of winning: Team A coach would prefer faster to start, slower to finish (A1  $\rightarrow$  A2, if v(A1) > v(A2))

### Best response (3/3)

B1  $\rightarrow$  B2, v(B1) > v(B2)<sup>1</sup>

		V0_A2																								
		2.7	2.725	2.75	2.775	2.8	2.825	2.85	2.875	2.9	2.925	2.95	2.975	3	3.025	3.05	3.075	3.1	3.125	3.15	3.175	3.2	3.225	3.25	3.275	3.3
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	2.8																	Indifferent	Indifferent	Indifferen	t A2->A1	A2->A1	A1->A2	Indifferent I	ndifferent	
	2.825																	Indifferent	Indifferent	A2->A1	A1->A2	A1->A2	Indifferent	Indifferent		
	2.85															Indifferent	Indifferent	A2->A1	A2->A1	A1->A2	A1->A2	Indifferent				
	2.875													Indifferen	Indifferent	Indifferent	A2->A1	A2->A1	A1->A2	Indifferen	t Indifferent	Indifferent				
	2.9													Indifferen	Indifferent	A2->A1	A2->A1	A1->A2	Indifferent	Indifferen	t Indifferent					
	2.925												Indifferen	tIndifferen	t A2->A1	A2->A1	A1->A2	Indifferent	Indifferent	Indifferen	t					
	2.95											Indifferent	Indifferen	t A2->A1	A2->A1	A1->A2	Indifferent	Indifferent	Indifferent	t						
-	2.975											Indifferent	Indifferen	t A2->A1	A1->A2	Indifferent	Indifferent	Indifferent								
-	3									Indifferent	t Indifferent	A1->A2	A1->A2	Indifferen	Indifferent	Indifferent	Indifferent									
	3.025								Indifferent	Indifferent	t A1->A2	A2->A1	A2->A1	Indifferen	Indifferent	Indifferent										
	3.05						1	Indifferent	t Indifferent	A1->A2	A1->A2	Indifferent	Indifferen	tIndifferen	Indifferent											
	3.075					I	Indifferent I	Indifferen	t A1->A2	A1->A2	A2->A1	Indifferent	Indifferen	tIndifferen	t											
	3.1				li li	ndifferent	Indifferent I	Indifferent	t A1->A2	A2->A1	Indifferent	Indifferent	Indifferen	t												
	3.125				li li	ndifferent	A1->A2	A1->A2	A2->A1	Indifferent	t Indifferent	Indifferent														
	3.15				Indifferent li	ndifferent	A1->A2	A2->A1	Indifferent	Indifferent	t Indifferent															
	3.175		1	ndifferent	Indifferent	A1->A2	A2->A1	Indifferent	t Indifferent	Indifferent	t															
	3.2		Indifferent I	ndifferent	A1->A2	A1->A2	A2->A1	Indifferent	t Indifferent																	
	3.225	Indifferen	t Indifferent I	ndifferent	A1->A2	A2->A1	Indifferent I	Indifferen	t																	
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With lower probability of winning: Team A coach would prefer faster to start, slower to finish  $(A1 \rightarrow A2, if v(A1) > v(A2))$ With higher probability of winning: Team A coach would prefer slower to start, faster to finish  $(A2 \rightarrow A1, if v(A1) > v(A2))$ 

### **Conclusions and next steps**

#### Conclusions

Theoretical modelling:

B1  $\rightarrow$  B2, v(B1) = v(B2)

Team A is weaker: slower to start, faster to finish Team A is stronger: faster to start, slower to finish

#### **Computer simulations:**

B1  $\rightarrow$  B2, v(B1) < v(B2)

With lower probability of winning: slower to start, faster to finish With higher probability of winning: faster to start, slower to finish

#### $B1 \rightarrow B2$ , v(B1) > v(B2)

With lower probability of winning: faster to start, slower to finish With higher probability of winning: slower to start, faster to finish

#### **Opportunities for further research**

Deep dive into border probabilities of winning:

• 50%?

Functional form of "choking" function:

• Other specifications (incl. asymmetric)

Differentiated "choking" function impact:

• E.g. strong players "choke" less

Simultaneous game and limited information case:

 Team A does not know Team B "choking function"

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