Состоялось очередное заседание научного семинара "Политическая экономика"

Speaker: Richard van Weelden (University of Chicago)
Topic:  "Informative Cheap Talk in Elections "
Co-author: Navin Kartik

Why do political candidates who are largely office-motivated sometimes espouse views that are non-congruent with those of their electorate?  Can non-congruent statements convey any information to voters about what a politician will do if elected, and if so, why would voters elect a politician who makes such statements?  We develop a model of credible non-binding communication in electoral campaigns about candidates' policy orientation.  The foundation is an endogenous voter preference for a politician who is known to be non-congruent over one whose congruence is sufficiently uncertain.  This preference arises because uncertainty about an elected official's policy orientation can generate large policymaking distortions due to politicians' reputation or career concerns.  We find that informative cheap talk in elections can either increase or decrease voter welfare relative to uninformative communication.

Заседание состоялось 16 .09.2014 в  18.15  по  адресу: г. Москва, улица Шаболовка, дом 26, корпус 4, аудитория 4322.