Состоялось очередное заседание научного семинара "Политическая экономика"

Докладчик:  Egor Abramov  (New Economic School)
Тема: "The Role of Reputatuion in non-democratic Succession"

The paper considers a simple battle for a throne game. A winner may either execute or spare a contender. Each player has either opportunistic or bloody type; the latter can only execute contenders. Each execution lowers both incentives of other players to pretend for a throne and the dictator's chances to survive next lost fight. Depending on the parameters, in the equilibrium opportunistic players either execute all contenders or almost always save their lives due to different belief of their types. Comparative statics shows that the “killing” equilibrium is more probable in countries with strong and bloody dictators, while arrival of a contender to the throne is less probable in countries with the same characteristics and, in addition, with larger dictator's benefits and smaller death penalty.


Заседание состоялось 17.12.2013 в    18.15   по  адресу: г. Москва, улица Шаболовка, дом 26, корпус 4, аудитория   4322.