Состоялось очередное заседание научного семинара "Политическая экономика"

Докладчик: Ольга Васильева (Амурский Государственный Университет)
Тема доклада: "Does Political Competition Matter for Public Goods Provision?: Evidence from Russian Regions"

Does political competition always improve public goods provision under autocracy? Which accountability mechanisms give better results? Using panel data covering 74 Russian regions for 2004-2009 we study how the intensity of local political competition affects governors' willingness to provide public goods. When there is competition in the local legislature, governors appointed by the national government provide more public goods than locally connected officials who divert

more funds for themselves. But when the party has a near monopoly of political power, governors from the region feel relatively more pressure from the local population and provide more public goods than new governors appointed by the central state who are not tied to local networks.

Moreover, we find evidence of a non-monotonic relationship between the intensity of political competition, the efficiency of accountability mechanisms, and some measures of public goods.

Полный текст статьи доступен на сайте  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2171097

Заседание состоялось 26.03.2013 в  18.15   по адресу: г. Москва, улица Шаболовка, дом 26, корпус 4, аудитория   4322.