Состоялось очередное заседание научного семинара "Политическая экономика"

Докладчик: Demand For Contract Enforcement in a Barter Economy
Тема доклада: Anna Rubinchik (University of Haifa)

Аннотация:

Do greater potential gains from trade enhance or erode contractinginstitutions? In our exchange model traders have to agree to interact and thereservation value of a tradeable good is determined in a stationary equilibrium. Thevalue depends, in particular, on the presence of a third party capable of enforcingthe contract signed by trading partners. We show that the willingness to pay forenforcement may exist even when contracts are sometimes broken in equilibrium.Larger potential gains from exchange may dampen the demand for enforcing thecontracts facilitating exchange: however, for `high quality' institutions (that overseethe interactions frequently enough) the gains from exchange contribute to a growingwillingness to pay for the enforcement.

Рабочий язык - английский.