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Статья
Fast Fourier solvers for the tensor product high-order FEM for a Poisson type equation

Zlotnik A.A., Zlotnik I.A.

Computational Mathematics and Mathematical Physics. 2020. Vol. 60. No. 2. P. 240-257.

Глава в книге
Innovation Development: Review and Estimation of Heterogeneity

Myachin A. L.

In bk.: Proceedings of the 20th International Conference on Group Decision and Negotiation. Ryerson University, 2020. P. 22.1-22.10.

Препринт
Matrix-vector approach to construct generalized centrality indices in networks

Aleskerov F. T., Yakuba V. I.

Математические методы анализа решений в экономике, бизнесе и политике. WP7. Высшая школа экономики, 2020. No. 2323.

Состоялось очередное заседание научного семинара "Политическая экономика"

Тема: "Political Risk, Information and Corruption Cycles: Evidence from Russian Regions" 
Докладчик: Dmitry Vorobiev (CERGE-EI, Prague)
Political budget cycles are a well-established phenomenon in which opportunistic politicians systematically adjust public policies in order to attract a higher number of votes prior to elections. We show that corrupt behavior of politicians also follows certain patterns which are driven by electoral cycles. Based on Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey data, we find that corruption levels, as perceived by firms operating in different regions of Russia, increases closer to the expected expiration date of a regional governor's term. We argue that the Russian political system allows governors to accumulate private information about their likelihood of remaining in office for another term and to know well in advance whether they will keep the office for the next term. We suggest that accumulation of such information may serve as an explanation for the observed pattern of perceived corruption: if a governor gradually learns that he is leaving the office once the current term is expired he has increasing incentives to engage in corrupt activities in order to accumulate wealth before he is out of the game. We formalize this idea with a simple theoretical model and test it. We find that in regions where incumbent governors are less likely to remain in office for the next term, corruption increases towards the end of their terms, while in regions where governors are more likely to remain in office, perceived corruption does not follow an increasing trend.


Заседание состоялось 24 февраля в  18:15 по адресу: г. Москва, улица Шаболовка, дом 26, корпус 4, аудитория 4322   .