Состоялось очередное заседание научного семинара "Политическая экономика", совместное с Международной Лабораторией анализа и выбора решений

"Electoral Bargaining in Runoff Elections: A Cooperative Game Theory Analysis and an Application to the French Regional Elections"
Докладчик:  Michel Le Breton (Toulouse 1 Capitole University)

This paper is an exploration in coalitional politics motivated by the French regional and municipal elections (but with a possibly larger scope of application). Elections of French regional and municipal councils proceeds as follows Two round elections, proportional representation with a "winner premium", and possibility of merging lists between the two rounds (under some conditions).Our primary objective is to try and account for how parties negotiate/bargain between the two rounds of such an election To this end, we build a model of bargaining in such a setting, where the analytical/structural framework we use is based on cooperative game theory, and derive its implications. We contrast these predictions to the Gamson predictions and actual outcomes observed in the 2010 French regional elections.


Заседание состоялось 17.02.2015 в 16:40 по адресу: г. Москва, улица Шаболовка, дом 26, корпус 4, аудитория 5306.