Состоялось очередное заседание научного семинара "Политическая экономика"

"Equivalence of candidate utility functions in electoral competition with probabilistic voting" 
Докладчик: Константин Сорокин  (ВШЭ)

Most of the existing literature on electoral competition assumes that the candidates or political parties maximize either the probability of winning the election, or the expected share of seats in the parliament. There are a number of reasons to believe that this is a significant simplification of reality. We examine the properties of equilibria in an electoral competition game depending on the shape of the candidate utility functions. We demonstrate that, if shocks to voter utility are uncorrelated, then the equilibrium strategies of candidates do not depend on their utility functions, if the number of voters is very large. If the shocks to voter utilities are correlated, then the electoral equilibrium will generically depend on the shape of candidate utility functions, even as the number of voters tends to infinity. The analysis is extended to the case when there are costs associated with selecting a particular campaign strategy.

Заседание состоялось 10.02.2015 в 18:15 по адресу: г. Москва, улица Шаболовка, дом 26, корпус 4, аудитория 4322.