Состоялось очередное заседание научного семинара "Политическая экономика"

Докладчик:  Jan Zapal  (CERGE-EI, IAE-CSIC,  and Barcelona GSE )
Тема:  "Dynamic Elections and Ideological Polarization"
Соавтор: Salvatore Nunnari (Columbia University)

Аннотация:

How does political polarization affect the welfare of the electorate? We analyze this question using a framework in which two policy and office motivated parties compete in an infinite sequence of elections. We propose two novel measures to describe the degree of conflict among agents:  antagonism  is the disagreement between parties;  extremism  is the disagreement between each party and the representative voter. We show that forward-looking parties have an incentive to implement policies favored by the representative voter, in an attempt to constraint future challengers. This incentive grows as antagonism increases. On the other hand, extremism decreases the electorate's welfare.

Научный семинар "Политическая экономика" состоялся 02 декабря (вторник) 2014г. в 18:15 в аудитории 4322.