Состоялось очередное заседание научного семинара "Политическая экономика"

Speaker:  Melis Kartal   (University of Vienna)
Topic: "An Experimental Study of Lobbying and Electoral Systems"
co-author: James Tremewan

 

Abstract:
Lobbying activity is expected to vary across different institutions, in particular across different electoral systems. This is because the design of the electoral system has implications for the responsiveness of politicians to lobbying, and thus, it affects the lobbying incentives of interest groups. Thus, the influence of organized groups on policy depends on the electoral rules of the game. We analyze a simple game in order to study lobbying and redistribution outcomes under different electoral systems. The basic question that we are after is this: How does varying the electoral system affect the capture by the rich; more generally, how does the electoral system affect the capture by a powerful, organized minority? Our theoretical findings show that majority rule and proportional representation give rise to different types of lobbying equilibria. Based on our theoretical analysis, we hypothesize that lobbying will be less prevalent under proportional representation. We will test the predictions of our model in a laboratory experiment shortly and report the results.

Заседание состоялось 25.11.2014 в     18.15    по адресу: г. Москва, улица Шаболовка, дом 26, корпус 4, аудитория   4322.