Состоялось очередное заседание научного семинара "Политическая экономика"

Speaker: Carlo Prato (Georgetown University)  
Topic: "Crises and The Puzzle of Reforms " 

Co-author: Stephane Wolton (University of Chicago)

The inability of the political process to produce welfare-improving reforms, especially when they are most needed, is both widespread and puzzling. We analyze a model of elections where successful communication of candidates' platforms during electoral campaigns requires effort from both candidates (senders) and a representative voter (receiver). We find that candidates' platform choices depend critically on the voter's gain from reform. When the gain from reform is low, no candidate proposes policy change; when the gain is high, non-competent politicians run on harmful reformist platform. In both cases, the voter would be better off if only competent politicians were to propose a reform policy. In contrast to the so called \crisis hypothesis," but in line with empirical findings, our model rationalizes why crises are not a good time for policy changes, and can lead to delayed or botched reforms.

Заседание состоялось 23.09.2014 в   18.15   по  адресу: г. Москва, улица Шаболовка, дом 26, корпус 4, аудитория 4322.