Состоялось очередное заседание научного семинара "Политическая экономика"

Докладчик:  Ruben Enikolopov (NES, University Pompeu Fabra)
Тема: " Theory and Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan"

Abstract:
Electoral rules matter for how individuals' information and policy preferences get aggregated, but little is known about how they affect the quality of elected officials. To address this question we exploit a unique field experiment which introduced randomized variation in the method of elections of village councils in 250 Afghan villages. In particular, we compare at-large elections with district elections. We propose a theoretical model where the difference in electoral systems occurs because elected legislators have to bargain over policy, and in district elections, citizens have a strategic motive to elect candidates with more polarized policy positions at the expense of competence. Empirical results prove consistent with the predictions of the model. Specifically, we find that competent candidates are more likely to be elected in at-large elections and that this difference is larger in more heterogenous villages. 


Заседание состоялось 06.02.2014 в   18.15   по  адресу: г. Москва, улица Шаболовка, дом 26, корпус 4, аудитория  4322.