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Статья
Fast Fourier solvers for the tensor product high-order FEM for a Poisson type equation

Zlotnik A.A., Zlotnik I.A.

Computational Mathematics and Mathematical Physics. 2020. Vol. 60. No. 2. P. 240-257.

Глава в книге
Innovation Development: Review and Estimation of Heterogeneity

Myachin A. L.

In bk.: Proceedings of the 20th International Conference on Group Decision and Negotiation. Ryerson University, 2020. P. 22.1-22.10.

Препринт
Matrix-vector approach to construct generalized centrality indices in networks

Aleskerov F. T., Yakuba V. I.

Математические методы анализа решений в экономике, бизнесе и политике. WP7. Высшая школа экономики, 2020. No. 2323.

Состоялось очередное заседание научного семинара "Политическая экономика"

Докладчик:  Dina Balalaeva, PhD (SUNY at Binghamton, NY, USA), post-doc (NRU HSE, Moscow, Russia)
Тема: " Overcoming innovation Blocking by Early Winners:  Political Competitiveness and Political institutions for Agenda Power Access"
Аннотация: 
Technological innovations are by no means Pareto-improving. While they mean a fortune to the innovator and society at large, they represent a nightmare for incumbent innovators or other early winners. I argue that, since early winners can use political means to block technological innovations, some political system features and political institutions may diminish their ability to do so. I specify an institutional mechanism of agenda power, which provides newcomers with an improved ability to enter the game. The greater proposal power politicians enjoy, the more they can safely “bet” on different vested interests and support the most efficient ones. Simultaneously, the existence of multiple entry points for newcomers diminishes the ability of early winners to capture politicians because now it is too many points to capture. A number of agenda power holders varies significantly among political systems, electoral systems, and administrative structure. With the sample of more than 120 countries and across the period of 20 years I show that more politically competitive systems, majoritarian electoral rules, and federal structures supply more agenda power holders in comparison to their counterparts and produce more innovations, other things equal.



Заседание состоялось 05.11.2013 в  18.15 по  адресу: г. Москва, улица Шаболовка, дом 26, корпус 4, аудитория   4322.