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Статья
Fast Fourier solvers for the tensor product high-order FEM for a Poisson type equation

Zlotnik A.A., Zlotnik I.A.

Computational Mathematics and Mathematical Physics. 2020. Vol. 60. No. 2. P. 240-257.

Глава в книге
Innovation Development: Review and Estimation of Heterogeneity

Myachin A. L.

In bk.: Proceedings of the 20th International Conference on Group Decision and Negotiation. Ryerson University, 2020. P. 22.1-22.10.

Препринт
Matrix-vector approach to construct generalized centrality indices in networks

Aleskerov F. T., Yakuba V. I.

Математические методы анализа решений в экономике, бизнесе и политике. WP7. Высшая школа экономики, 2020. No. 2323.

Состоялось очередное заседание научного семинара "Политическая экономика"

Speaker: Trevor Johnston (University of Michigan)
Topic: " Divide and Distribute: The Political Economy of Minority Segregation and Authoritarian Distribution "
Contrary to conventional wisdom, few autocrats rely exclusively, or even principally, on repression to survive.  Instead, they exploit a variety of distributive strategies, buying popular support and co-opting elite challengers as necessary.  According to existing theory, however, none of these strategies should involve targeted goods to politically disenfranchised minorities or other marginalized groups.  Yet in some regimes, we find this very practice, begging the question: why provide benefits to the marginalized?  In answering this question, I explore the puzzling case of Qatar, where the regime regularly targets distributive goods to otherwise marginalized groups.  Such targeting is simply inexplicable for existing theories of authoritarianism.  To explain this behavior, I offer a formal theory of authoritarian support-buying under the threat of sabotage.  Even groups marginalized from traditional venues of power can influence distributive policy by threatening to destroy capital or undermine its growth.  In testing my theory, I draw on a unique dataset of GIS data from Qatar.  My empirical strategy exploits the spatial segregation of groups to evaluate the relationship between distributive targeting and the location of marginalized communities.  Ultimately, I show how the Qatari regime targets distributive goods to different communities, favoring citizens over non-citizens and potential saboteurs over non-threatening groups.


Заседание состоялось 04.06.2013 в  18.15 по адресу: г. Москва, улица Шаболовка, дом 26, корпус 4, аудитория 4322.