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Статья
Fast Fourier solvers for the tensor product high-order FEM for a Poisson type equation

Zlotnik A.A., Zlotnik I.A.

Computational Mathematics and Mathematical Physics. 2020. Vol. 60. No. 2. P. 240-257.

Глава в книге
Innovation Development: Review and Estimation of Heterogeneity

Myachin A. L.

In bk.: Proceedings of the 20th International Conference on Group Decision and Negotiation. Ryerson University, 2020. P. 22.1-22.10.

Препринт
Matrix-vector approach to construct generalized centrality indices in networks

Aleskerov F. T., Yakuba V. I.

Математические методы анализа решений в экономике, бизнесе и политике. WP7. Высшая школа экономики, 2020. No. 2323.

Состоялось очередное заседание научного семинара "Политическая экономика"

Speaker: Shaun McGirr  (University of Michigan)
Topic: " Deliberate Indiscretion: why bureaucratic agencies are differently corrupt "
Abstract:
The study of corruption has largely ignored the question of whether and why it varies across bureaucratic agencies within the same state. In this paper I briefly establish, using existing survey data, that within-state variation in agency corruption is significant relative to between-state variation: the least corrupt agency in a corrupt state can be less corrupt than the most corrupt agency in a state with significantly lower `average' corruption. I then posit two explanations for this finding drawn from the existing literature, and a novel one of my own. The first two are relatively obvious: agencies are set up to do different things (the sectoral explanation), and they are differently constrained (the structural explanation). My contribution is to explain how rent-maximizing political leaders exploit these differences across agencies, keeping in mind that the opposition (within or outside the elite) has an incentive to discredit the leader by revealing as much corruption as possible. This begets a strategic interaction: the leader's decisions about which agencies to monitor and punish for corruption depend on what the opposition sees as its own best opportunities, and vice versa. This leads to empirical predictions about how sectoral and structural differences across agencies interact with the political battle between leader and opposition to generate different equilibrium levels of corruption per agency. Finally, I offer preliminary tests of some hypotheses using comprehensive data on the purchasing behavior of all federal agencies of the Russian government for 2011-2013.

Заседание состоялось 14.05.2013 в  18.15  по адресу: г. Москва, улица Шаболовка, дом 26, корпус 4, аудитория  4322.