Состоялось очередное заседание общемосковского научного семинара "Политическая экономика"

Тема доклада: "The Strategic Use of Transparency and The Persistence of Election Fraud"
Докладчик: Frederik Sjoberg (New York University)

Аннотация:

Why would an autocrat want, or at least make it appear to want, to reduce election fraud? In recent years, non-democratic rulers have surprisingly begun to embrace fraud-reducing technologies, like web cameras or transparent ballot boxes. The reason for this is found in the relative ease by which one type of fraud can be replaced with another. With the help of new fraud identification techniques, I argue that the installation of web cameras in polling stations changes how fraud is conducted. Web cameras do not reduce fraud, but rather make certain blatant forms of fraud, like ballot box stuffing, more costly. Autocrats then substitute for other types of fraud, such as fabricating vote count outside the view of the cameras, in order to secure electoral victory. Overall, this paper identifies this compensation mechanism where incumbents are able to prevent vote share losses, while contributing a veneer of legitimacy by self-initiating anti-fraud measures.

 

Рабочий язык: английский