Состоялось очередное заседание научного семинара "Политическая экономика"

Докладчик: Ozgur Evren (New Economic School)
Тема доклада: Altruism and Voting: A Large-Turnout Result That Does not Rely on Civic Duty or Cooperative Behaviour

Аннотация:             

The paper studies costly voting in a game-theoretic framework. Individuals are distinguished by their types: their ideological preferences, voting costs and whether they are selfish or "altruistic." An altruistic agent places positive, additive weight on her own payoff and those of everyone else. Despite the presence of altruism, if types are independently and identically distributed, the classical theorem of Palfrey and Rosenthal (APSR, 1985) on the impossibility of large-scale turnout survives. I solve this problem by introducing additional uncertainty about the fraction of altruistic agents who support a given candidate. I show that under suitable homogeneity assumptions, this modified setup is asymptotically equivalent to the rule utilitarian voter model of Feddersen and Sandroni (AER, 2007), which is known to be consistent with large-scale turnout and strategic behavior. Moreover, while the latter model necessitates these homogeneity assumptions, my theory is also compatible with several forms of heterogeneity in agents' characteristics.

 

Рабочий язык - английский.