Состоялось очередное заседание научного семинара "Политическая экономика"

Докладчик: Anna Rubinchik (University of Haifa)
Тема доклада: Demand For Contract Enforcement in a Barter Economy

Аннотация:

Do greater potential gains from trade enhance or erode contracting institutions? In our exchange model traders have to agree to interact and the reservation value of a tradeable good is determined in a stationary equilibrium. The value depends, in particular, on the presence of a third party capable of enforcing the contract signed by trading partners. We show that the willingness to pay for enforcement may exist even when contracts are sometimes broken in equilibrium. Larger potential gains from exchange may dampen the demand for enforcing the contracts facilitating exchange: however, for `high quality' institutions (that oversee the interactions frequently enough) the gains from exchange contribute to a growing willingness to pay for the enforcement.

Рабочий язык - английский.