Состоялось внеочередное заседание общемосковского научного семинара "МАТЕМАТИЧЕСКИЕ МЕТОДЫ АНАЛИЗА РЕШЕНИЙ В ЭКОНОМИКЕ, БИЗНЕСЕ И ПОЛИТИКЕ"

Vincent Merlin (University of Caen and CNRS) - "The case of two candidate elections I: The axiomatic approach"

Аннотация доклада:

The objective of  this course is to introduce Social Choice theory by focussing on the most simple case, an election between two candidates only. We then consider a finite population of nvoters, who have to decide collectively whether candidate A or candidate B is the best one.

After introducing some notations and definitions, we present the characterization of majority vote due to May (1952):  May's theorem states that simple majority voting is the only anonymous, neutral, and monotone choice function between two alternatives. We discuss the other possibilities proposed by Fishburn (1973) and Murakami (1968) by relaxing the above mentioned conditions.

At last, we wonder whether there exists, for two candidates, a indirect voting system that would always mimic the result of indirect voting.  Recent  papers by Chambers (2008) and Bervoets and Merlin (2010) show that the possibilities are not appealing from a democratic point of view.

 

Рабочий язык: английский

Текст доклада:  Merlin 27.10.10.pdf

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 

Руководители семинара: д.т.н., проф. Алескеров Фуад Тагиевич, д.т.н., проф. Подиновский Владислав Владимирович. 
Соруководитель семинара - д.т.н., проф. Миркин Борис Григорьевич,

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------