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Статья
Fast Fourier solvers for the tensor product high-order FEM for a Poisson type equation

Zlotnik A.A., Zlotnik I.A.

Computational Mathematics and Mathematical Physics. 2020. Vol. 60. No. 2. P. 240-257.

Глава в книге
Innovation Development: Review and Estimation of Heterogeneity

Myachin A. L.

In bk.: Proceedings of the 20th International Conference on Group Decision and Negotiation. Ryerson University, 2020. P. 22.1-22.10.

Препринт
Matrix-vector approach to construct generalized centrality indices in networks

Aleskerov F. T., Yakuba V. I.

Математические методы анализа решений в экономике, бизнесе и политике. WP7. Высшая школа экономики, 2020. No. 2323.

Семинар "Политическая экономика": Maxim Ananyev (The University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research) о переводе доходов в офшоры.

На семинаре "Политическая экономика" Maxim Ananyev (The University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research) рассказал о предлагаемой новой теории, объясняющей, почему одни многонациональные фирмы часто переводят свои доходы в низконалоговые юрисдикции, а другие нет.

Тема: Political Economy of Cross-Border Income Shifting: A Protection Racket Approach

Аннотация:

Multinational firms often shift their incomes to low-tax jurisdictions, thus robbing host states of tax revenue. I offer a new theory to explain why some firms do this while others do not. I argue that firms that are more vulnerable to government expropriation are, counterintuitively, less likely to shift income offshore, since complying fully with tax law gives the government a greater stake in their survival. Analyzing a registry-based panel data on multinational firms, their tax burdens, and a cross-sectional information of the firms’ connections to tax havens, l find that, other things equal, firms with more concentrated fixed assets are less likely to use havens. These results challenge existing theories of the political economy of development. Whereas the “Pillars of Prosperity” theory suggests that successful states simultaneously develop protection of property rights and fiscal capacity, my results show that perfect property rights protection can actually undermine the state’s ability to tax. In a world of frictionless international capital flows, some level of expropriation risk may be necessary to prevent a fiscal crisis due to evasion.

Совместный научный семинар "Политическая экономика" с Лабораторией исследования социальных отношений и многообразия общества РЭШ (ЛИСОМО РЭШ) и Международным центром изучения институтов и развития НИУ ВШЭ (МЦИИР ВШЭ) состоялся 2 июля 2019г.

Руководитель семинара: А.В. Захаров (НИУ ВШЭ), К.И. Сонин (НИУ ВШЭ, The University of Chicago Harris School of Public Policy)