Семинар "Политическая экономика": Aleksandr Demin (New York University) о влиянии политических институтов.

На семинаре "Политическая экономика" Aleksandr Demin (New York University) рассказал о том, как как формальные политические институты способствуют долгосрочному развитию.

Тема: Why Does Persistance Happen (and Not)? A Model of Institutions and Culture in Long-Run Economic Development

Аннотация:

Recent studies have convincingly shown that history matters for long-run development through various mechanisms whenever it is observed. What are the conditions for a decision to have persistent effects? I develop a theory of how formal political institutions and cultural transmission contribute to long-run effects. In the model, citizens select contributions to private and public goods, while the political elite decides on the expropriation and enforcement of public goods provision. The game is played in two periods with a stochastic social transformation occurring in between. First, the model shows how initially weak institutions contribute to the negative developmental effects. Second, the conditions for the persistence of cooperation on public goods with imperfect information are characterized. Importantly, transmission of beliefs works together with enforcing institutions, sustaining each other.

Совместный научный семинар "Политическая экономика" с Лабораторией исследования социальных отношений и многообразия общества РЭШ (ЛИСОМО РЭШ) и Международным центром изучения институтов и развития НИУ ВШЭ (МЦИИР ВШЭ) состоялся 17 декабря 2019г.

Руководитель семинара: А.В. Захаров (НИУ ВШЭ), К.И. Сонин (НИУ ВШЭ, University of Chicago)