Семинар "Политическая экономика": James Tremewan (Auckland University) о кандидатах, побеждающих на выборах с явно неоднозначными платформами.

На семинаре "Политическая экономика" James Tremewan (Auckland University) рассказал о том, почему кандидаты с явно неоднозначными платформами могут победить на выборах.

Тема: Ambiguous Policies and Correlated Preferences

Аннотация:

There are many popular accounts of candidates winning elections with markedly ambiguous platforms. Clear empirical evidence regarding ambiguous platforms as well as the reasons for their attractiveness is however quite limited. We test a novel mechanism that explains the success of ambiguous platforms in an equilibrium model with fully rational players. In a citizen-candidate model of electoral competition, we show that if policy preferences are correlated in a society, this correlation can lead candidates to run on ambiguous platforms and voters to support them. In a laboratory experiment, we show that when voters' and candidates' preferences are correlated, ambiguous platforms gain notable support and can even win elections. Moreover, leveraging on the heterogeneity of cognitive ability of players in the game, we provide direct support for the underlying mechanism which drives the use and support of ambiguous platforms.

Совместный научный семинар "Политическая экономика" с Лабораторией исследования социальных отношений и многообразия общества РЭШ (ЛИСОМО РЭШ) и Международным центром изучения институтов и развития НИУ ВШЭ (МЦИИР ВШЭ) состоялся 28 января 2019г.

Руководитель семинара: А.В. Захаров (НИУ ВШЭ), К.И. Сонин (НИУ ВШЭ, University of Chicago)