Совместное онлайн-заседание Общемосковского семинара "Экспертные оценки и анализ данных" и семинара "Математические методы анализа решений в экономике, бизнесе и политике" НИУ ВШЭ

Тема: Revenue-Maximizing Matching Algorithms 
Докладчики: Kemal Kivanc Akoz, Emre Dogan

Аннотация:

We consider the matching algorithm choice of a revenue-maximizing matching platform on a two-sided finite society where agents are ordered by their pizzazz values, and therefore preferences are homogeneous. The platform sets gender-specific prices and a matching algorithm specifying a random matching over each possible membership base. We show that the platform maximizes its revenue by executing uniform random matching over the membership base formed of the entire scarce type of agents and the same number of other type of agents with top pizzazz values. Moreover, this outcome can be supported as a subgame-perfect equilibrium.

Заседание состоится в 16:30 онлайн на платформе Zoom. Ссылка для входа: https://zoom.us/j/96808639091