Доклад Васильева Дениса
На встрече рабочей группы 29 апреля Васильев Денис рассказал о своем исследовании в рамках магистерской диссертации.
Тема доклада: Optimal jury composition in contests with biased reviewers: theory and an empirical application
I study the optimal jury composition in a lottery contest game, where each jury member can be biased towards a particular contestant. In my model, a bias in favor of a contestant increases his probability of winning and is the outcome of the voting game between the jury members. I show that the presence of a biased jury member creates non-zero chances to get the bias in an equilibrium not only for the favorite contestant, but also for his opponent . For the contest designer, who maximizes the aggregate effort, the bias size and the jury composition are valid instruments to level the playing field only under large heterogenity between the contestants. For the designer, who is better off by the win of the strong contestant, the bias size is the only instrument under large heterogeneity, while small heterogeneity implies strict preference of the jury favoring the strong contestant. The results of the reduced form estimation on data from professional dance sport competitions are consistent with the theoretical predictions: (1) there is a positive bias effect on the winning probabaility under corresponding belief structure, (2) the degree of heterogeneity decreases the bias effect, (3) a negative bias effect is lower in magnitude than a positive bias effect.