Выступление аспиранта ИРГ Руслана Шавшина на научном семинаре Brown Bag МИЭФ

На научном семинаре МИЭФ 9 октября Шавшин Руслан представил своё совместное с Мариной Сандомирской исследование об влиянии запасов фирм на ценообразование и мэтчинг на конечных рынках.

Тема: Microfoundations for the Directed Search in a Finite Market: Capacities, Bargaining Power, and Matching 

 

Аннотация: The paper proposes a model of a finite two-sided market with a limited arbitrary number of products per seller, where buyers are involved in a directed search for the appropriate purchase. The effect of friction, discovered for the models with a single product per seller, remains, though the competition intensifies. We derive an analytical formula for the case of an equal number of products for every seller and deduce that the equilibrium price decreases with the growth of availability, while the seller's utility is a bell-shaped function of the number of products. This means that unlimited growth of availability is not approved by sellers. For the asymmetric capacities, the main effects remain the same, though the advantage of the large firm is detected.
We apply the developed approach to the optimal design of a labor market with friction. The side of the market that makes wage proposals influences surpluses of both firms and workers. However, generally they prefer divers market organization. We discover under which conditions the preferences about the leading side are agreed and how this related with socially optimal design.