• A
  • A
  • A
  • АБB
  • АБB
  • АБB
  • А
  • А
  • А
  • А
  • А
Обычная версия сайта
Книга
Recent Advances of the Russian Operations Research Society

Под науч. редакцией: F. T. Aleskerov, А. А. Васин.

Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2020.

Статья
Stability of implicit difference schemes for a linearized hyperbolic quasi-gasdynamic system of equations
В печати

Zlotnik A.A., Chetverushkin B.

Differential Equations. 2020. Vol. 56. No. 7. P. 910-922.

Глава в книге
Belief Functions for the Importance Assessment in Multiplex Networks

Lepskiy A., Meshcheryakova N.

In bk.: Information Processing and Management of Uncertainty in Knowledge-Based Systems. IPMU 2020. Vol. 1238. Prt. 2. Cham: Springer, 2020. P. 283-296.

Препринт
Matrix-vector approach to construct generalized centrality indices in networks

Aleskerov F. T., Yakuba V. I.

Математические методы анализа решений в экономике, бизнесе и политике. WP7. Высшая школа экономики, 2020. No. 2323.

Очередное заседание научного семинара "Политическая экономика"

Speaker: David Szakonyi (Columbia University, HSE)
Topic: " Firm-Level Returns from Connections to Elected Politicians: Evidence from Russia "

Abstract:
Do firms benefit from political connections? In recent years, a substantial literature has uncovered a positive correlation between political ties and a wide range of firm performance indicators. However, because connections between politicians and firms are not randomly assigned, the improved balance sheet outcomes that connected firms experience may instead reflect other underlying characteristics. For example, more competent firm directors may be effective at both developing in-roads with politicians and increasing firm revenue, making any relationship between the two spurious. In response, this paper employs a regression discontinuity (RD) design to identify the true causal effect of the acquisition of political connections on firm performance. Using a unique dataset of over 5,223 firms in Russia, I compare financial outcomes between firms that are connected to political candidates who either won or lost close elections to subnational legislative institutions. I find that a connection to a winning politician can net a firm at least an additional $13 million in revenue and $800,000 in net profits, which are substantial figures compared to those of firms having had directors lose an election. The value of winning office for firms is amplified in more economically developed regions, where natural resources are present, and when directors that are members of the ruling party. Greater success in receiving state contracts drives the improvements in firm performance.

 

Научный семинар "Политическая экономика" состоялся 09 июня (вторник) 2015г. в 18:15

Семинар проводится совместно с РЭШ, соруководители семинара: А.В.Захаров (НИУ ВШЭ), К.И. Сонин (НИУ ВШЭ)