• A
  • A
  • A
  • АБB
  • АБB
  • АБB
  • А
  • А
  • А
  • А
  • А
Обычная версия сайта
Глава в книге
The Estimation of the Individual Travelling Salesman Problem Complexity Extreme Values

Zhukova G., Ulyanov M.

In bk.: Communications in Computer and Information Science. Vol. 1204: Modern Information Technology and IT Education. SITITO 2017. Springer, 2021. P. 261-270.

Препринт
On properties of compact 4th order finite-difference schemes for the variable coefficient wave equation

Zlotnik A., Čiegis R.

math. arxive. Cornell University, 2021. No. ArXiv: 2101.10575v2[math.NA].

Семинар "Политическая экономика": Алексей Ощепков о сетевой коррупции

На семинаре "Политическая экономика" Алексей Ощепков (ВШЭ) рассказал о сетевой (или местной) коррупции, которая обусловлена ​​социальными связями между чиновниками и частными агентами. Используя данные опроса «Жизнь в переходный период» (LiTS), который охватывает все постсоциалистические страны, Алексей показал, что сетевая коррупция более устойчива во времени, в меньшей степени связана с текущими национальными социально-экономическими и институциональными характеристиками и имеет более сильные исторические корни, чем рыночная коррупция.

Тема: Market and Network Corruption

соавтор Maria Kravtsova (HSE)

Аннотация:

Economists tend to reduce all corruption to impersonal market-like transactions, ignoring the role of social ties in shaping corruption. In this paper, we show that this simplification substantially limits the understanding of corruption. We distinguish between market corruption (impersonal bribery), and network (or parochial) corruption which is conditional on the social connections between bureaucrats and private agents. We argue, both theoretically and empirically, that these types of corruption have different qualities. Using data from the Life in Transition Survey (LiTS) which covers all post-socialist countries we show, first, that the correlation between market and network corruption is weak, which implies that ignoring network corruption leads not only to an underestimation of the overall scale of corruption but also biases national corruption rankings. Secondly, in line with theoretical expectations, we find that network corruption is more persistent over time, less related to contemporary national socio-economic and institutional characteristics and has stronger historical roots than market corruption. Yet, network corruption, unlike bribery, is not able to ‘grease the wheels’ and is not associated with political instability. Lastly, we show that the decline in bribery which was observed in almost all post-socialist countries in the period from 2010 to 2016 was accompanied by rising network corruption in many of them, which has important policy implications.

Совместный научный семинар "Политическая экономика" с Лабораторией исследования социальных отношений и многообразия общества РЭШ (ЛИСОМО РЭШ) и Международным центром изучения институтов и развития НИУ ВШЭ (МЦИИР ВШЭ) состоялся 26 февраля 2019г.

Руководитель семинара: А.В.Захаров (НИУ ВШЭ), К.И. Сонин (НИУ ВШЭ, The University of Chicago Harris School of Public Policy)