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Regular version of the site
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Events
Jan 22 – Mar 1
online 
Article
An Approach to Estimating the Economic Expediency of Developing a New Cargo Transport Hub by a Regional Public Administration

Belenky A., Fedin G., Kornhauser A.

International Journal of Public Administration. 2021. Vol. 44. No. 13. P. 1076-1089.

Book chapter
A note on subspaces of fixed grades in Clifford algebras

Shirokov D.

In bk.: AIP Conference Proceedings. Vol. 2328: ICMM-2020. AIP Publishing LLC, 2021. Ch. 060001. P. 060001-1-060001-4.

Working paper
On compact 4th order finite-difference schemes for the wave equation

Zlotnik A., Kireeva O.

math. arXiv. Cornell University, 2020. No. arXiv:2011.14104v2[math.NA].

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Alexei Zakharov Presented the Report on 'Valence influence in electoral competition with rank objectives'

On May 17 a research seminar on political economy took place at HSE. Alexei Zakharov (HSE) spoke on 'Valence influence in  electoral competition with rank objectives'.

Coauthors: Alexander Shapoval (HSE), Shlomo Weber (NES, Southern Methodist University)

Abstract:

In this paper we examine  the effects of valence  in a continuous spatial voting model between two incumbent parties and one potential entrant. All parties  are rank-motivated and are driven by their place in the electoral competition.

 

One of our main results is that a sufficiently wide  valence gap between the incumbents yields  an  equilibrium in which no entry will occur. We also show that an increase in valence shifts the high-valence incumbent party closer to the median voter, while the low-valence incumbent selects a more extreme platform.