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Regular version of the site
Numerical method for 3D two-component isothermal compressible flows with application to digital rock physics
In print

Balashov V., Savenkov E., Zlotnik A.

Russian Journal on Numerical Analysis and Mathematical Modelling. 2019. Vol. 34.

Book chapter
Influence Assessment in Multiplex Networks using Social Choice Rules

Shvydun S. V.

In bk.: Procedia Computer Science. Vol. 139: 6th International Conference on Information Technology and Quantitative Management. 2018. P. 182-189.

HSE Seminar on Political Economy: Heike Hennig-Schmid (Laboratory for Experimental Economics University of Bonn) about the dishonesty in healthcare practice

Topic: Dishonesty in healthcare practice: A behavioral experiment on upcoding in neonatology

joint work with Hendrik Jürges,  Daniel Wiesen

Dishonest behavior signicantly increases the cost of medical care provision. Upcoding of patients is a common form of fraud to attract higher reimbursements. Imposing audit mechanisms including fines to curtail upcoding is widely discussed among healthcare policy-makers. How audits and fines affect individual health care providers' behavior is empirically not well understood. To provide new evidence on fraudulent behavior in health care, we analyze the effect of a random audit including fines on individuals' honesty by means of a novel controlled behavioral experiment framed in a neonatal care context. Prevalent dishonest behavior declines signicantly when audits and fines are introduced. The effect is driven by a reduction in upcoding when being detectable. Yet, upcoding increases when not being detectable as fraudulent. We find evidence that individual characteristics (gender, medical background, integrity) are related to dishonest behavior. Policy implications are discussed.

HSE Seminar on Political Economy: Andrea Matozzi (European University Institute) about the Voter Turnout with Peer Punishment

Topic: Voter Turnout with Peer Punishment

joint work with David K. Levine

We introduce a model of turnout where social norms, strategically chosen by competing political parties, determine voters' turnout. Social norms must be enforced through costly peer monitoring and punishment. When the cost of enforcement of social norms is low, the larger party is always advantaged. Otherwise, in the spirit of Olson (1965), the smaller party may be advantaged. Our model shares features of the “ethical” voter model and it delivers novel and empirically relevant comparative statics results.

HSE Seminar on Political Economy: Anand E. Sokhey (University of Colorado at Boulder) about the impact of physical attractiveness of on productivity

Topic: Beyond Thoughts and Prayers: The Christian Nationalism of the Gun Control Debate 

joint work with Paul A. Djupe (Denison University) and Andy Lewis (University of Cincinnati)

Abstract:The U.S. has the 31st highest rate of non-conflict gun violence in the world, far outpacing its socio-economic peers. And, over the past decade, public debate over gun control in the United States has grown immensely. However, despite public outcry, there has been almost no traction on gun control. We investigate a previously understudied mechanism to address this puzzle: religion. Do Christian nationalist values impede many religious Americans from supporting gun control?  In this paper we present multifaceted approach to the relationship between religion and gun control, drawing upon the integration of Christian nationalist views, partisanship, and clergy messaging. Our data comes from a May 2018 national sample of the United States, and we make comparisons to a 2007 national sample to assess consistency and change. 

HSE Seminar on Political Economy: Jan Fidrmuc (Department of Economics and Finance and CEDI, Brunel University) about the impact of physical attractiveness of on productivity

Topic: "Beautiful Minds: Physical Attractiveness and Research Productivity in Economics "

joint work with Boontarika Paphawasit (College of Arts, Media and Technology, Chiang Mai University, Thailand)

Abstract: We study the impact of physical attractiveness of on productivity. Previous literature found a strong impact on wages and career progression, which can be either due to discrimination in favor of good-looking people or can reflect an association between attractiveness and productivity. We utilize a context where there is no or limited face-to-face interaction, academic publishing, so that scope for beauty-based discrimination should be limited. Using data on around 2,000 authors of journal publications in economics, we find a significantly positive effect of authors’ attractiveness on both journal quality and citations. However, the impact on citations disappears after we control for journal quality. 

HSE Seminar on Political Economy: Anastasia Burkovskaya (University of Sydney) about Electoral Model and Ballot Stuffing

Topic: Identification of Electoral Model and Ballot Stuffing 


This paper introduces a model of electoral choice that allows for derivation of joint distribution of turnout and voter share from unobservable joint distribution of costs of voting and preferences over candidates. Under a set of mild assumptions, we show non-parametric identification of joint distribution of costs of voting and preferences over candidates from observable data on single elections/referendum. We also offer an extension of the model that helps to identify ballot stuffing type of electoral fraud. In addition, we offer an empirical illustration of the model estimation using 2011 Russian parliamentary election data.

HSE Seminar on Political Economy: Konstantin Sonin (University of Chicago and Higher School of Economics, Moscow) about Media Freedom

Topic: " Media Freedom in the Shadow of a Coup "

Media freedom is a problem for any dictator as it resolves collective action problem in protests. However, a dictator might allow media freedom if there is a threat of a palace coup, the most frequent end of an autocratic leader tenure. We use a global game approach to analyze a situation, in which the incumbent leader trades off the possibility of protest against him and the possibility of protests aimed to restore his power if he is dismissed in a coup. Thus, media freedom serves as an ex ante protection for such a dictator, and the higher is the probability of a coup, the more media freedom the dictator would tolerate.

HSE Seminar on Political Economy: Ethan Bueno de Mesquita (University of Chicago) about cyberwarfare models

Topic: "Deterrence with Imperfect Attribution "

joint work with Sandeep Baliga (Northwestern University) and Alexander Wolitzky (MIT)

Abstract: Motivated by recent developments in cyberwarfare, we study deterrence in a world where attacks cannot be perfectly attributed to attackers. In the model, each of n attackers may attack the defender. The defender observes an imperfect signal that probabilistically attributes the attack. The defender may retaliate against one or more attackers, and wants to retaliate against the guilty attacker only. We uncover an endogenous strategic complementarity among the attackers: if one attacker becomes more aggressive, that attacker becomes more “suspect” and the other attackers become less suspect, which leads the other attackers to become more aggressive as well. Improving the defender’s ability to detect attacks or identify the source of attacks can hinder deterrence and lead to more attacks, but simultaneously improving both detection and identification—in that some attacks which previously went undetected are now both detected and unambiguously attributed—always reduces attacks. Deterrence is improved if the defender can commit to a retaliatory strategy in advance, but the defender should not always commit to retaliate more after every signal.

HSE Seminar on Political Economy: Chris Berry (University of Chicago) about Leader Effects

Topic: "Leadership or Luck? Randomization Inference for Leader Effects" 

Anecdotal evidence suggests that some political leaders are more effective than others, causing better outcomes for their citizens. However, observed differences in outcomes between leaders could be attributable to chance variation. To solve this inferential problem, we develop RIFLE, a quantitative test of leader effects. RIFLE allows researchers to test a null hypothesis of no leader effect and also estimate the proportion of variation in an outcome variable attributable to leaders vs. other factors, and it provides more statistical power and more reliable inferences than other strategies. To demonstrate the substantive value of RIFLE, we implement it for world leaders, U.S. governors, and U.S. mayors and for several outcomes. RIFLE can be applied to virtually any setting with leaders and an objective outcome of interest, so its continued application should improve our understanding of where, when, and why leaders matter.  

HSE Seminar on Political Economy: Chris Miller (Fletcher School, Tufts University) about the Politics of Inflation and the Distribution of Income in Early 1990s Russia

Topic: "The Politics of Inflation and the Distribution of Income in Early 1990s Russia "

Abstract: This paper will reexamine the failure to stabilize prices, making use of newly collected sources from the State Archive of the Russian Federation as well as Yegor Gaidar’s personal archive. First, the paper will examine the Gaidar team’s views of inflation in 1991 and their expectations and preferences for 1992 and 1993. Then, the paper will reconstruct debates about inflation and monetary policy during the crucial years of 1992 and 1993, illustrating the extent to which Russia’s legislature, the Verkhovny Sovet, demanded policies that made price stabilization impossible. Finally, the paper will explore the distributional effects of the inflation, concluding by noting that the inflation’s reduction of household well-being is consistent with the thesis that firms and their representatives in the Verkhovny Sovet pushed the policies that made inflation inevitable.

HSE Seminar on Political Economy: Andy Eggers (Nuffield College, Oxford University, UK) about strategic voting

Topic: " Who votes more strategically? "

Abstract: Strategic voting is an important explanation for aggregate political phenomena, but we know little about how strategic voting varies across types of voters. Are richer voters more strategic than poorer voters? Does strategic behavior vary with age, education, gender or political leaning? The answers may be important for assessing how well an electoral system represents different preferences in society. We introduce a new approach to measuring and comparing strategic voting across voters that can be broadly applied given appropriate survey data. In recent British elections, we find no difference in strategic voting by education level, but we do find that older voters are more strategic than younger voters, richer voters are more strategic than poorer voters, and left-leaning voters are more strategic than right-leaning voters. In the case of age and income, the difference in strategic voting exacerbates known inequalities in political participation.
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