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Regular version of the site

109028, Moscow, Pokrovsky Boulevard 11, T423
Phone: +7 (495) 621 13 42,
+ 7(495) 772 95 90 *27200; *27212.
Email: dhm-econ@hse.ru

School Head Fuad T. Aleskerov
Manager Oksana Kolotvina
Anastasia Lomakina
Senior Administrator Anastasia Lomakina
Fast Fourier solvers for the tensor product high-order FEM for a Poisson type equation

Zlotnik A.A., Zlotnik I.A.

Computational Mathematics and Mathematical Physics. 2020. Vol. 60. No. 2. P. 240-257.

Book chapter
Innovation Development: Review and Estimation of Heterogeneity

Myachin A. L.

In bk.: Proceedings of the 20th International Conference on Group Decision and Negotiation. Ryerson University, 2020. P. 22.1-22.10.

Working paper
Matrix-vector approach to construct generalized centrality indices in networks

Aleskerov F. T., Yakuba V. I.

Математические методы анализа решений в экономике, бизнесе и политике. WP7. Высшая школа экономики, 2020. No. 2323.

HSE Seminar on Political Economy: Ekaterina Borisova (NRU HSE) about the Elections, Protest and Trust in Government

Topic: "Elections, Protest and Trust in Government: A Natural Experiment from Russia"
co-authored with Timothy Frye

What influences a level of trust between a government and citizens? It seems that one of key factors that determine it is fair elections. However, according to some studies, in autocracies post-election protests play an important role in the development of the trust of population. For instance, in Russian, an attitude of citizens toward the government is significantly improved in case such protests are not forbidden by the authorities. On the seminar dedicated to the article «Elections, Protest and Trust in Government: A Natural Experiment from Russia» the professor of NRU HSE Ekaterina Borisova spoke about that in more detail.


How do elections and post-election protest shape political attitudes under autocracy? Taking advantage of the largely exogenous variation in the timing of a survey conducted in Moscow, we examine the short-term impact of the parliamentary election of December 4th, and the large protest of December 10th on trust in the Russian government. The election had little effect on attitudes toward government, perhaps because vote improprieties were not new information. In contrast, the large and unexpected protest of December 10th increased trust in government. We argue that when protests are permitted unexpectedly, citizens may update their beliefs about the trustworthiness of the government. We find that  heightened trust arises largely from non-supporters of the ruling party - those most likely to be surprised by permission to hold the protest - updating their beliefs rather than from social desirability bias, a perceived improvement in government performance, or a “halo” effect. It also suggests that autocrats can increase trust in government by allowing protests when it is unexpected.

the joint seminar of Higher School of Economics on political economy, International Center for the Study of Institutions and Development (ICSID) and NES Center for the Study of Diversity and Social Interaction was held March 28.