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Contacts

109028, Moscow, Pokrovsky Boulevard 11, T423
Phone: +7 (495) 621 13 42,
+ 7(495) 772 95 90 *27200; *27212.
Email: dhm-econ@hse.ru; shatskaya@hse.ru

Administration
School Head Fuad T. Aleskerov
Manager Oksana Kolotvina
Svetlana Shatskaya
Senior Administrator Svetlana Shatskaya
Article
An Approach to Estimating the Economic Expediency of Developing a New Cargo Transport Hub by a Regional Public Administration

Belenky A., Fedin G., Kornhauser A.

International Journal of Public Administration. 2021. Vol. 44. No. 13. P. 1076-1089.

Book chapter
A note on subspaces of fixed grades in Clifford algebras

Shirokov D.

In bk.: AIP Conference Proceedings. Vol. 2328: ICMM-2020. AIP Publishing LLC, 2021. Ch. 060001. P. 060001-1-060001-4.

Working paper
On compact 4th order finite-difference schemes for the wave equation

Zlotnik A., Kireeva O.

math. arXiv. Cornell University, 2020. No. arXiv:2011.14104v2[math.NA].

HSE Seminar on Political Economy: Anne Meng (University of Virginia) about Leadership Succession in Dictatorial Regimes

Under what conditions can autocratic regimes undergo successful leadership transitions? The problem of transferring power has long been identified as one of the key challenges of continued authoritarian rule. Two main mechanisms that have emerged as potential solutions for autocratic succession are the presence of a ruling party and the implementation of hereditary succession. However, using a global dataset of autocratic successions from 1946-2015, I show that hereditary successions are incredibly rare in modern dictatorships, and that the presence of a ruling party is not a strong predictor of peaceful leadership succession. Instead, I argue that constitutional rules play a critical role in regulating the process of autocratic succession. I show evidence of this argument using original data on constitutional amendments outlining succession rules and the appointment of a de facto successor in 47 African countries from 1960-2005. I find that regimes that have formal succession rules written into the constitution and leaders who designate a clear successor are significantly more likely to undergo multiple leadership successions – regardless of whether the regime has a long-standing ruling party. Rather than introducing the crown prince problem, planning for leadership succession seems to be a stabilizing force for continued autocratic rule.

the joint seminar of Higher School of Economics on political economy, International Center for the Study of Institutions and Development (ICSID) and NES Center for the Study of Diversity and Social Interaction was held on September 19.