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PhD, University of Pennsylvania
The chapter analyzes the influence of K. Marx's "Capital" on reformist Populism, legal Marxism and Katheder-sozialismus in Russia. Special attention is paid to heated discussions about the stages of Russia's economic development in comparison with Western Europe.
The paper develops a new extension of the sequential preference condition, which leads to unique stable matching in all subpopulations, obtained by consistent restrictions of the marriage matching problem. Under the new condition, the Gale–Shapley algorithm is stable, consistent, strategy-proof, Pareto optimal for men, and Pareto optimal for women.
The paper examines the arguments held by Marx’s contribution to the study of technical change, distribution, and heterogeneous labour. In contraposition to some mainstream views on these issues, we show through textual exegesis that the upshot of Marx’s analysis is that technological progress would not only mean an eventual rise in unemployment; it is also a means to reduce the likelihood of distributional conflict between profits and wages.
We test the performance of myopic and farsighted stability concepts in a network formation experiment with a stream of payoffs and relatively unstructured link formation process. A subtle treatment variation demonstrates clearly the power of myopic stability concepts in precisely identifying the set of the most stable networks. However, we also find support for the predictions of farsighted concepts of stability, especially those that assume players' pessimism about the eventual outcome of a deviation. This is the first study to demonstrate that there exist environments where farsighted stability concepts identify empirically stable networks that are not identified by myopic concepts. Thus, myopic stability concepts are not necessarily sufficient to predict all stable outcomes in empirical applications.
This paper provides an extended analysis of an equilibrium concept for non-cooperative games with boundedly rational players: Nash-2 equilibrium. Players think one step ahead and account for all profitable responses of player-specific subsets of opponents because of both the cognitive limitations on predicting everyone’s reaction and the inability to make deeper and certain predictions. They cautiously reject improvements that might lead to worse profits after some reasonable response. For n-person games we introduce the notion of a reflection network consisting of direct competitors to express the idea of selective farsightedness. For almost every 2-person game with a complete reflection network, we prove the existence of a Nash-2 equilibrium. Nash-2 equilibrium sets are obtained in models of price and quantity competition, and in Tullock’s rent-seeking model with two players. It is shown that such farsighted behavior may provide strategic support for tacit collusion. The analyses of n-person Prisoner’s dilemma and oligopoly models with a star reflection structure demonstrate some possibilities of strategic collusion and a large variety of potentially stable outcomes.
The paper studies group-separable preference profiles. Such a profile is group-separable if for each subset of alternatives there is a partition in two parts such that each voter prefers each alternative in one part to each alternative in the other part. We develop a parenthesization representation of group-separable domain. The precise formula for the number of group-separable preference profiles is obtained. The recursive formula for the number of narcissistic group-separable preference profiles is obtained. Such a profile is narcissistic group-separable if it is group-separable and each alternative is preferred the most by exactly one voter.
This article describes the dynamic optimization model with human capital as a group educational characteristic (along with these groups population) and as the main factor of their production. The main feature of this model is inequality in qualification which leads towards the run for the middle as unlinear dynamics of educational effectiveness for different groups. The research of the simulation model in one specific regime allowed to describe two different scenarios. They include the development of the groups and run for the middle dynamics. These results allow stating conceptual usability of the model for real society dynamics description.
In this paper, we propose a two-sector endogenous growth model of transition from
the period of pre-industrial stagnation to a sustainable growth regime. In the model
the slight structural changes in the Malthusian world influence a proportion of power
distribution between landowners and capitalists, and finally lead to the adoption of
institutions, favoring industrial development. These changes trigger the non-drastic
transition to the modern growth regime. The model can explain the dynamic and
the intensity of conflict between landowners and capital holders during the transition
This study is dedicated to estimating the impact of currency risk on the cost of equity in Brazil, Russia, India and South Africa. Our contribution to the literature is that we have obtained evidence on the pricing of exchange rate risk in developing countries, which at the time of writing is quite scarce. This scarcity is one motivation for our research, which is dedicated to BRICS capital markets, though with the Chinese stock market excluded since it is heavily regulated. The aim of this research is to determine whether in emerging countries stock markets currency risk is a significant factor that influences the cost of equity capital in a company. Changes in the value of exchange rates can impact the cash flows of a firm and its exposure to risk, and hence, the value of the company. In our research we will discuss the influence of exchange rate movements on the value of firms through their impact on the cost of equity. Specifically, we investigate whether companies that report substantial currency gains or losses have to pay a higher required rate of return on equity. Furthermore, in this study we make an attempt to estimate currency risk premia for exposure to appreciation and depreciation of currency separately, and try to identify possible differences. For each country, three analytical models that extend the Fama-French Three Factor Model (by incorporating currency risk) are estimated. We use an equal-weighted portfolio approach to identify currency risk factors. These factors are estimated either by using information about the ratio of currency gains to sales, or the magnitude of covariation between equity returns and exchange rate changes. In the second case appreciation and depreciation of domestic currency against the US dollar is considered separately. The results indicate that in Russia, firms which report substantial currency losses pay a positive risk premium, while in Brazil, India and South Africa companies with significantly positive or negative currency gains pay a lower required return on equity than firms with almost zero currency gains. Finally, we attempt to explain the estimation results using a sectoral breakdown of product exports for each country of the data sample.
In this paper we examine the effects of valence in a continuous spatial voting model with two incumbent candidates and a potential entrant. All candidates are rank-motivated. We first consider the case where the low valence incumbent (LVC) and the entrant have zero valence, whereas the valence of the high valence incumbent (HVC) is positive. We show that a sufficiently large valence of HVC guarantees a unique equilibrium, where the two incumbents prevent the entry of the third candidate. We also show that an increase in valence allows HVC to adopt a more centrist policy position, while LVC selects a more extreme position. We also examine the existence of equilibrium for the cases where the LVC has higher or lower valence than the entrant.
This paper provides evidence for retrospective voting in the very long-term by exploiting a unique quasi-natural experiment of history. We trace the origins of party identification to a critical juncture in the local history of Sasun, a mountainous region of the Ottoman Empire located in Eastern Turkey. Sasun received vital support from the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF) both during the Great Massacres against Armenians at the end of the 19th century and during the Armenian Genocide (1915–1917). With the help of the ARF, some of the survivors from Sasun were resettled in various villages in modern-day Armenia. Although the party was not active in Armenia during seven decades of Soviet rule, we find that villages with Sasun ancestry display substantially higher electoral support for the ARF than other villages. Evidence from first names of current residents and our field work suggest that this differential support can, at least in part, be explained by historical gratitude and sympathy for the party. We offer suggestive evidence to explain why this sympathy might have endured over generations.
The paper focuses on finding distinctive features of the transmission mechanism of unconventional monetary policy measures: quantitative easing and credit easing. The analysis carried out in the paper suggests that the transmission of traditional and unconventional monetary policy measures is fundamentally different only at the initial stage of the transfer mechanism: the impact of monetary shock on the financial market. At the middle stage (the impact of the financial market parameters on the behavior of macroeconomic agents), as well as at the final stage (the impact of macroeconomic agents' behavior on the real sector), the transmission mechanism of unconventional measures (quantitative easing and credit easing) is similar to traditional measures. Distinctive features of the impact of unconventional policy measures on the financial market are their directional, targeted, character, as well as the novelty of the impact of mode: in quantitative easing, the transfer of monetary shock goes through a change in reserves; private assets.
Stability of inflation expectations is a necessary part of inflation targeting. Among many factors that may affect the dynamics of inflation expectations, one of the most important is the communication policy of the central bank and representatives of the government. This paper measures the effectiveness of verbal interventions by the Government and the Bank of Russia on the high-frequency indicator of inflation expectations from the stock market for the period July 2015 – December 2016. Dummy variables are used to characterize verbal interventions in terms of the
degree of regularity, the source and the information contained. One of the main features of this paper is the analysis of the verbal interventions from individual representatives of monetary and fiscal policies. By the assessment of the model of conditional heteroscedasticity, we conclude that verbal interventions by the Bank of Russia and
members of the Government of the Russian Federation accompanied by decrease of inflation expectations: key verbal interventions were statements about state budget deficit and future inflation. The results obtained can be used to develop the communication policy tools in future.
The article aims to analyze the influence of different types of corruption on inflation in case of independent Central Bank and, therefore, absence of seignorage. Basing on fiscal and monetary policymakers behavior, we use simple model to analyze the joint impact of “grand” and “petty cash” corruption on the Central Bank optimal inflation rate. Research offers a slightly different view on the corruption-inflation relationship and concludes that different forms of heterogeneous corruption affects inflation in various ways both directly and indirectly.
In the aftermath of 2007—2009 global financial crisis, many economies had stuck in a liquidity trap. This stance forced central banks to implement various unconventional monetary policies, including massive purchases of financial assets, cutting policy rates down into the negative zone and reliance on forward guidance. In this paper we critically discuss these policy measures. Unconventional policy success in overcoming a liquidity trap heavily depends on the ability to manage private agents’ expectations. If the central bank is capable to form expectations of low interest rates for a prolonged period after the escape from a liquidity trap, unconventional monetary policies lead to a recovery. Another crucial issue is dynamic inconsistency of prolonged low interest rate policy. We discuss several ways of how the central bank can commit not to lift policy rate up to keep inflation unnecessary low.