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PhD, University of Pennsylvania
The chapter analyzes the influence of K. Marx's "Capital" on reformist Populism, legal Marxism and Katheder-sozialismus in Russia. Special attention is paid to heated discussions about the stages of Russia's economic development in comparison with Western Europe.
The paper develops a new extension of the sequential preference condition, which leads to unique stable matching in all subpopulations, obtained by consistent restrictions of the marriage matching problem. Under the new condition, the Gale–Shapley algorithm is stable, consistent, strategy-proof, Pareto optimal for men, and Pareto optimal for women.
The article traces trends in Soviet economic discourse from the 1920s until perestroika. We examine the works of leading political economists of this period through the lens of debates on market exchanges under socialism—the central theoretical issue of the political economy of socialism. The discursive structure underlying the debates can be traced back to the writing of the first Soviet textbook on political economy, personally supervised by Joseph Stalin. Our purpose is to assess the impact of this textbook on subsequent discussions of the role of commodity production and market exchanges in a socialist economy. The story suggests that Soviet economic discourse was neither homogeneous nor stable. Rather, it consisted of several subdiscourses of different levels of authoritativeness allowing for a certain stable core as an attribute of any authoritative discourse, as well as for more flexible elements that adjusted the structure to new political and ideological challenges.
Since 2013, Initial Coin Offerings (ICO) have allowed companies to attract financing with the help of cryptocurrencies. Statistics of ICO shows that the ICO market is increasing and demand for funds continues to grow with claims of over $ 15 billion raised in the first half of 2018. The increasing volumes of investment in ICO projects as an alternative method to venture capital or IPO are caused by, for example, the possibility of reselling the received tokens at a higher price after the launch of the project or obtaining the company’s services at lower prices. While the importance of the topic is growing, there is the absence of fundamental works emphasizing the determinants of an ICO’s success. The scientific novelty of the forthcoming research consists in the formation of the model evaluation of ICO success. Using econometric analysis based on data for 1392 projects, we show that the volatility of the main cryptocurrencies has a significant impact on the success of ICO. The constraints of the platform for Smart Contacts (ERC‑20) and dependence on the Ethereum volatility overcome all other factors. Our data contributes to existing literature and shows the insignificance of the sector of the project, almost all location region and fluctuation of influence of quality of the team. This result may be explained by the uncertainty of the investor about the project (weak signals), absence of the regulation and legal framework. This result is beneficial for owners of companies since it is an argument for decreasing costs for marketing.
The concept of Methodenstreits is used to analyse the relationship between behavioral and mainstream economics. A Methodenstreit is understood by the authors as a dispute between the more abstract and the less abstract canons of the economic science. It undergoes several necessary stages: discovery of a new research instrument, an exaggerated debate between the canons, and mutual enrichement after the debate. The article reviews the following Methodenstreits: empirical investigations of Hall, Hitch, and Lester vs neoclassical theory of the firm (the ‘full cost controversy’ and the ‘marginalist controversy’); Katona’s consumer research vs Keynesian macroeconomics; Simon’s bounded rationality approach vs neoclassical maximization; and experiments of Allais and others vs expected utility theory.
This edited volume examines the relationship between economic ideas, economic policies and development institutions, analysing the cases of 11 peripheral countries in Europe, Latin America and Asia across the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
It sheds light on the obstacles that have prevented the sustained economic growth of these countries and examines the origins of national and regional approaches to development. The chapters present a fascinating insight into the ideas and visions in the different locations, with the overarching categories of economic nationalism and economic liberalism and how they have influenced development outcomes.
This book will be valuable reading for advanced students and researchers of development economics, the history of economic thought and economic history.
The paper examines the arguments held by Marx’s contribution to the study of technical change, distribution, and heterogeneous labour. In contraposition to some mainstream views on these issues, we show through textual exegesis that the upshot of Marx’s analysis is that technological progress would not only mean an eventual rise in unemployment; it is also a means to reduce the likelihood of distributional conflict between profits and wages.
We test the performance of myopic and farsighted stability concepts in a network formation experiment with a stream of payoffs and relatively unstructured link formation process. A subtle treatment variation demonstrates clearly the power of myopic stability concepts in precisely identifying the set of the most stable networks. However, we also find support for the predictions of farsighted concepts of stability, especially those that assume players' pessimism about the eventual outcome of a deviation. This is the first study to demonstrate that there exist environments where farsighted stability concepts identify empirically stable networks that are not identified by myopic concepts. Thus, myopic stability concepts are not necessarily sufficient to predict all stable outcomes in empirical applications.
This paper provides an extended analysis of an equilibrium concept for non-cooperative games with boundedly rational players: Nash-2 equilibrium. Players think one step ahead and account for all profitable responses of player-specific subsets of opponents because of both the cognitive limitations on predicting everyone’s reaction and the inability to make deeper and certain predictions. They cautiously reject improvements that might lead to worse profits after some reasonable response. For n-person games we introduce the notion of a reflection network consisting of direct competitors to express the idea of selective farsightedness. For almost every 2-person game with a complete reflection network, we prove the existence of a Nash-2 equilibrium. Nash-2 equilibrium sets are obtained in models of price and quantity competition, and in Tullock’s rent-seeking model with two players. It is shown that such farsighted behavior may provide strategic support for tacit collusion. The analyses of n-person Prisoner’s dilemma and oligopoly models with a star reflection structure demonstrate some possibilities of strategic collusion and a large variety of potentially stable outcomes.
The paper studies group-separable preference profiles. Such a profile is group-separable if for each subset of alternatives there is a partition in two parts such that each voter prefers each alternative in one part to each alternative in the other part. We develop a parenthesization representation of group-separable domain. The precise formula for the number of group-separable preference profiles is obtained. The recursive formula for the number of narcissistic group-separable preference profiles is obtained. Such a profile is narcissistic group-separable if it is group-separable and each alternative is preferred the most by exactly one voter.
Popular uprisings in autocracies seldom lead to democratic regimes. We propose a model that helps explain how rents from power encourage popular revolts. We study why citizens would follow a dissident group seeking regime change, if rents from change accrue only to the group. Our model predicts that higher rents may increase the incidence of public mobilization because rents facilitate coordination. The results suggest that cohesive dissident groups may spur seemingly spontaneous mass mobilizations, even when the mass public know that the dissident group is driven by greed rather than a genuine desire to halt incumbent’s rent‐seeking activities.
This article describes the dynamic optimization model with human capital as a group educational characteristic (along with these groups population) and as the main factor of their production. The main feature of this model is inequality in qualification which leads towards the run for the middle as unlinear dynamics of educational effectiveness for different groups. The research of the simulation model in one specific regime allowed to describe two different scenarios. They include the development of the groups and run for the middle dynamics. These results allow stating conceptual usability of the model for real society dynamics description.