Состоялось очередное заседание научного семинара "Политическая экономика"

Speaker: Mehmet Ekmekci  ( Boston college )
Topic: " Manipulated Electorates and Information  Aggregation "

co-author: Stephan Lauermann (University of Bonn)

Abstract:

We study information aggregation with a biased election organizer who recruits voters at some cost. Voters are symmetric ex-ante and prefer policy a  in state A and policy b in state B, but the organizer prefers policy a regardless of the state. Each recruited voter observes a private signal that is imperfectly informative about the unknown state, but does not learn the size of the electorate.  In contrast to existing results for large elections, there are equilibria in which information aggregation fails:  As the voter recruitment cost disappears, a perfectly informed organizer can ensure that policy a is implemented independent of the state by appropriately choosing the number of recruited voters in each state.

 

  Manipulated Electorates and Information Aggregation (PDF, 469 Кб)

Address: The HSE building at Shabolovka (ul. Shabolovka 26-4, room 4405).
If you don't have a HSE picture ID, please contact political.economy.hse@gmail.com to order a pass for the seminar before 12:00, Tuesday May 19.
See the web-page of the seminar http://economics.hse.ru/demat/politecon

 

Научный семинар "Политическая экономика" состоялся 19 мая (вторник) 2015г. в 18:15
Семинар проводится совместно с РЭШ, соруководители семинара: А.В.Захаров (НИУ ВШЭ), К.И. Сонин (НИУ ВШЭ)