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Regular version of the site
Contacts

109028, Moscow, Pokrovsky Boulevard 11, T423
Phone: +7 (495) 621 13 42,
+ 7(495) 772 95 90 *27200; *27212.
Email: dhm-econ@hse.ru; shatskaya@hse.ru

Administration
School Head Fuad T. Aleskerov
Manager Oksana Kolotvina
Svetlana Shatskaya
Senior Administrator Svetlana Shatskaya
Events
Feb 1 – Mar 15
online 
Article
An Approach to Estimating the Economic Expediency of Developing a New Cargo Transport Hub by a Regional Public Administration

Belenky A., Fedin G., Kornhauser A.

International Journal of Public Administration. 2021. Vol. 44. No. 13. P. 1076-1089.

Book chapter
A note on subspaces of fixed grades in Clifford algebras

Shirokov D.

In bk.: AIP Conference Proceedings. Vol. 2328: ICMM-2020. AIP Publishing LLC, 2021. Ch. 060001. P. 060001-1-060001-4.

Working paper
On compact 4th order finite-difference schemes for the wave equation

Zlotnik A., Kireeva O.

math. arXiv. Cornell University, 2020. No. arXiv:2011.14104v2[math.NA].

Mehmet Ekmekci Delivered a Rerport on 'Manipulated Electorates and Information Aggregation'

On May 19 a research seminar on political economy took place at HSE. Mehmet Ekmekci (Boston college) spoke on 'Manipulated Electorates and Information  Aggregation'. The report is co-authored by Stephan Lauermann (University of Bonn).

Abstract: 

We study information aggregation with a biased election organizer who recruits voters at some cost. Voters are symmetric ex-ante and prefer policy a  in state A and policy b in state B, but the organizer prefers policy a regardless of the state. Each recruited voter observes a private signal that is imperfectly informative about the unknown state, but does not learn the size of the electorate.  In contrast to existing results for large elections, there are equilibria in which information aggregation fails:  As the voter recruitment cost disappears, a perfectly informed organizer can ensure that policy a is implemented independent of the state by appropriately choosing the number of recruited voters in each state.