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Алескеров Фуад Тагиевич — руководитель департамента, доктор технических наук, ординарный профессор
Колотвина Оксана Альбертовна — менеджер
Питра Татьяна Георгиевна — cтарший администратор
Никитин А. А.
М.: Юрайт, 2017.
Bronevich A. G., Rozenberg I. N.
International Journal of General Systems. 2018. Vol. 27. No. 1. P. 67-96.
In bk.: Proceedings of the Nineteenth International Conference on Geometry, Integrability and Quantization. Vol. 19. Sofia: Avangard Prima, 2018. Ch. 1. P. 11-53.
Gordin V. A., Tsymbalov E. A.
math. arxive. Cornell University, 2017
Докладчик: Дементьев Андрей (Высшая школа экономики) Тема: "Contracting out public services to asymmetric partnerships"Аннотация:
The paper studies an organisational structure of contracting out public utilities to an asymmetric partnership between the local authorities and a vertically integrated firm. Being fiscally constrained and politically motivated the government delegates pricing decision in the downstream market to a partnership while the upstream market for essential input is not regulated directly. The accompanying regulatory instrument, namely the net budget transfer, is valued at the social cost of public funds and can be set ex post making the firm’s participation constraint non-binding. A negative budget transfer effectively extracts the firm’s rent in the non-regulated upstream market and depends on the corporate structure of the partnership. We build a formal model that predicts that local authorities with relatively high share in the partnership should decrease the net transfer when the profit margin in the downstream market falls. The empirical support for this finding is found in the panel data for 25 suburban passenger companies in Russia in 2011-2015. The effect of the share structure on the relationship between the compensation ratio and farebox ratio is captured by the interaction variable highlighting the nonlinear effect. The failure to fully compensate operational losses in the transportation market is interpreted as a system of pseudo-franchising contracts in the Russian suburban railway transport that, to some extent, reflects political preferences of the local authorities in the country.