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Contacts

109028, Moscow, Pokrovsky Boulevard 11, T423
Phone: +7 (495) 621 13 42,
+ 7(495) 772 95 90 *27200; *27212.
Email: dhm-econ@hse.ru

Administration
School Head Fuad T. Aleskerov
Manager Oksana Kolotvina
Anastasia Lomakina
Senior Administrator Anastasia Lomakina
Book
Recent Advances of the Russian Operations Research Society

Edited by: F. T. Aleskerov, А. А. Васин.

Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2020.

Article
Stability of implicit difference schemes for a linearized hyperbolic quasi-gasdynamic system of equations
In press

Zlotnik A.A., Chetverushkin B.

Differential Equations. 2020. Vol. 56. No. 7. P. 910-922.

Book chapter
Belief Functions for the Importance Assessment in Multiplex Networks

Lepskiy A., Meshcheryakova N.

In bk.: Information Processing and Management of Uncertainty in Knowledge-Based Systems. IPMU 2020. Vol. 1238. Prt. 2. Cham: Springer, 2020. P. 283-296.

Working paper
Matrix-vector approach to construct generalized centrality indices in networks

Aleskerov F. T., Yakuba V. I.

Математические методы анализа решений в экономике, бизнесе и политике. WP7. Высшая школа экономики, 2020. No. 2323.

HSE Seminar on Political Economy: Andrei Dementiev (Higher School of Economics) about сontracting out public services to asymmetric partnerships

The paper studies an organisational structure of contracting out public utilities to an asymmetric partnership between the local authorities and a vertically integrated firm. Being fiscally constrained and politically motivated the government delegates pricing decision in the downstream market to a partnership while the upstream market for essential input is not regulated directly. The accompanying regulatory instrument, namely the net budget transfer, is valued at the social cost of public funds and can be set ex post making the firm’s participation constraint non-binding. A negative budget transfer effectively extracts the firm’s rent in the non-regulated upstream market and depends on the corporate structure of the partnership. We build a formal model that predicts that local authorities with relatively high share in the partnership should decrease the net transfer when the profit margin in the downstream market falls. The empirical support for this finding is found in the panel data for 25 suburban passenger companies in Russia in 2011-2015. The effect of the share structure on the relationship between the compensation ratio and farebox ratio is captured by the interaction variable highlighting the nonlinear effect. The failure to fully compensate operational losses in the transportation market is interpreted as a system of pseudo-franchising contracts in the Russian suburban railway transport that, to some extent, reflects political preferences of the local authorities in the country.

 seminar of Higher School of Economics on political economy was held on October 17.