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Regular version of the site
Contacts

109028, Moscow, Pokrovsky Boulevard 11, T423
Phone: +7 (495) 621 13 42,
+ 7(495) 772 95 90 *27200; *27212.
Email: dhm-econ@hse.ru; shatskaya@hse.ru

Administration
School Head Fuad T. Aleskerov
Manager Oksana Kolotvina
Svetlana Shatskaya
Senior Administrator Svetlana Shatskaya
Events
Feb 1 – Mar 15
online 
Article
An Approach to Estimating the Economic Expediency of Developing a New Cargo Transport Hub by a Regional Public Administration

Belenky A., Fedin G., Kornhauser A.

International Journal of Public Administration. 2021. Vol. 44. No. 13. P. 1076-1089.

Book chapter
A note on subspaces of fixed grades in Clifford algebras

Shirokov D.

In bk.: AIP Conference Proceedings. Vol. 2328: ICMM-2020. AIP Publishing LLC, 2021. Ch. 060001. P. 060001-1-060001-4.

Working paper
On compact 4th order finite-difference schemes for the wave equation

Zlotnik A., Kireeva O.

math. arXiv. Cornell University, 2020. No. arXiv:2011.14104v2[math.NA].

Olga Kuznetsova Spoke on 'Public Information and Strategic Interaction of Policymakers'

On April 28 a research seminar on political economy took place at HSE.

Olga Kuznetsova (HSE) spoke on 'Public Information and Strategic Interaction of Policymakers'. The event was organised by the School of Mathematics and the New Economic School. 

Abstract:

The literature that analyzes the social value of public information has considerably expanded in recent years. Nevertheless, majority of existing studies neglects the fact that in reality public signals come from different agents with different goals. Thus the primary goal of our research is to fill this gap and to investigate the informational interaction of policymakers who have different objectives and can use public signals to influence private agents. For this purpose we build a model of two-region economy that is hit by two idiosyncratic shocks. Information structure is defined by two policymakers each of which maximizes welfare of one of the regions. We find out that equilibrium information strategies can be not optimal from the social planner point of view: the policymaker from a small region tends to be too transparent while the policymaker from the big region may be too opaque. Moreover, we show that characteristics of social optimum in our model differ significantly from the standard for this literature field: transparency may be detrimental only if strategic complementarity is low.