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Regular version of the site
Contacts

109028, Moscow, Pokrovsky Boulevard 11, T423
Phone: +7 (495) 621 13 42,
+ 7(495) 772 95 90 *27200; *27212.
Email: dhm-econ@hse.ru; shatskaya@hse.ru

Administration
School Head Fuad T. Aleskerov
Manager Oksana Kolotvina
Svetlana Shatskaya
Senior Administrator Svetlana Shatskaya
Events
Feb 1 – Mar 15
online 
Article
An Approach to Estimating the Economic Expediency of Developing a New Cargo Transport Hub by a Regional Public Administration

Belenky A., Fedin G., Kornhauser A.

International Journal of Public Administration. 2021. Vol. 44. No. 13. P. 1076-1089.

Book chapter
A note on subspaces of fixed grades in Clifford algebras

Shirokov D.

In bk.: AIP Conference Proceedings. Vol. 2328: ICMM-2020. AIP Publishing LLC, 2021. Ch. 060001. P. 060001-1-060001-4.

Working paper
On compact 4th order finite-difference schemes for the wave equation

Zlotnik A., Kireeva O.

math. arXiv. Cornell University, 2020. No. arXiv:2011.14104v2[math.NA].

Mattias Polborn Delivered a Lecture on 'Political Competition in Legislative Elections'

On June 16 a research seminar on political economy took place at HSE. Mattias Polborn (University of Illinois) spoke on 'Political Competition in Legislative Elections'

Abstract:
We develop a theory of candidate nomination processes predicated upon the notion that members of the majority party in a legislature collaboratively influence policy. Because of this team aspect, a candidate's party label  matters for voters, in addition to his own policy positions: For example, in a liberal district, electing even a liberal Republican may be unattractive for voters because it increases the chance that Republicans obtain the majority in Congress, thereby increasing the power of more conservative Republicans.

We show that candidates may be unable to escape the burden of their party association, and that primary voters in both parties are likely to nominate extremist candidates. We also show that gerrymandering affects the equilibrium platforms not only in those districts that become more extreme, but also in those that ideologically do not change.